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INTRODUCTION
Woodrow Wilson said on April 3, 1917,
Does not every American feel that assurance has been
added to our hope for the future peace of the world by
the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? • • • Here
is a fit partner for a League of Honor" (1:512).
Wilson depicted in this statement the American reaction to
the March Revolution in Tsarist Russia of 1917.

The United

States was about to enter the Great War where her main
objectives would be to defeat Germany and save the world
for democracy; the Russian Revolution represented to the
United States a first movement toward the paramount goal
of freeing the people of the world from the harsh rule of
autocracyo
This paper will study the relationship between the
newly established Russian Provisional Government and the
United States, March through November of 19170

The purpose

of this study is to describe the diplomatic relations between
the two governments and to illuminate the shortcomings of
the United States in these relationso

United States foreign

policy in 1917 was primarily concerned with continuation of
the war effort, and she pressed a war-weary Russian populace
to keep fighting to save the intangible political ideal of
democracy.

The Russian people were reluctant to go on

fighting a war to obtain the wartime goals of their deposed

2

ruler and the Allies.

These people did not look upon the

defeat of German militarism as the sole means for saving
the world for peace; they felt that the Allies themselves
must repudiate all profits from a German defeat and dedicate themselves to the emancipation of all the enslaved
peoples of the world.

The defeat of Germany was not the

ultimate goal of the Russian peopleo

The Woodrow Wilson

administration, on the other hand, felt that Germany's
defeat was the first and most important step to a peaceful
world.

Herein lies the basis for a misunderstanding; the

hope of one to build a free nation, and the goal of the
other to defeat German militarism.

The attitude of the

United States toward the Provisional Government developed
from a misunderstanding of the events at that time and
misinterpretation of the aspirations of the Russian people.
This study will attempt to illuminate the misunderstanding.
Few historians have taken the time to deal specifically with relations between the United States and the
Russian Provisional Government.

Edward H. Carr, in his

four volume work, ! History .Q,f Russia: The Bolshevik

~

lution, devotes only one chapter to the diplomacy between
the two governments in question.
March, .12.11-March, 1920: Documents
edited by

c.

Russian-American Relations,
~

Papers, compiled and

K. Cumming and Walter Wo Pettit is questionable

as to its thoroughness because it was published in 1921, so
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few years after the Bolshevik Revolution.

Materials avail-

able at that time were limited compared to that which is
currently available.

"The Review of Books" in the American

Historical Review, January, 1921, was very critical of the
Cummings work because of his selectiveness of documents;
the over-emphasis on Raymond Robins' involvement reduced
the objectivity of the work (48:371-72).

Since then, a

three volume work, The Russian Provisional Government,

.1211,

covering Russian affairs more thoroughly, was written by
Alexander Kerensky and Robert Paul Browder.
Many monographs have been written about different
aspects of this particular time in diplomatic history.

A

few were written by the actual participants, for example:
David R. Francis' Russia From
Hundred

~

~

American Embassy; One

Days by Edgar Sisson; The Catastrophe by

Alexander Kerensky; and Henry P. Davison's
Red Cross

in

~

~American

Great War.

Since the Second World War additional material has
appeared, but the period of the Provisional Government is
written only as a small part of a larger study, or as in
the case of Alexander Kerensky's memoirs, given as a subjective account of the actual events.
Politics~

Arno J. Mayer's

Diplomacy of Peacemaking, published in 1967,

devotes just over three chapters to Russia of 1917 and
handles related topics in a very objective fashion.

The
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most popular work of this period is George F. Kennan's
Soviet-American Relations,

~-1920,

two volumes.

Kennan

felt that the weakness of the Russian Provisional Government and its inability to continue the war effort should
have awakened the United States to the realization of
Russia's inadequacy as a good war partner.

He continued

by saying:
Yet the fact is that neither of these realities was
widely noted in the United States; it is, indeed, not
an exaggeration to say that the policy of the United
States government toward the Russian Provisional
Government was founded largely on ignorance of both
of them and on the hope that just the opposite would
be the case: that Russia would evolve rapidly, that is,
in the direction of democratic stability, and that she
would continue to prosecute vigorously, as a loyal and
enthusiastic member of the western coalition, the war
against Germany. In these misunderstandings will be
found the roots not only of much of the ineffectiveness
of American policy toward the Provisional Government
but also of the difficulty experienced by many Americans
at a later date in adjusting to the realities of Soviet
power (29:12).
This writer agrees with Mr. Kennan, but Mr. Kennan used
this misunderstanding as a basis for the beginning of his
two volume work on Soviet-American relations, excluding,
except briefly in the first chapter, American relations
with the Provisional Government.

With the availability

of State Department material in the National Archives, the
Russian-United States war diplomacy of 1917 can be more
clearly defined.
The division of this paper will consist of five
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chapters followed by a brief summary.

Chapter One is

entitled "United States' Reaction to the March Revolution,"
and will include reactions from the State Department, public opinion, and Russian opinion of their own events.

The

Second Chapter, "Diplomacy: April, May and June," will
follow the development of usual diplomatic relations in a
chronological manner.

Chapter Three, "Special Missions to

Russia," will deal with the United States' efforts through
the use of special committees sent to Russia, to convince
her to continue in the war, the most important and well
known committee being the Root Mission, headed by Elihu
Root.

Chapter Four, "Diplomacy: July through October,"

will again explain development of the diplomatic relations
during this time.

The Fifth Chapter, "United States Reac-

tion to the November Revolution," will describe the initial
reaction to the revolution and the general attitude toward
the very early days of the Bolshevik government.
Dates throughout this paper will be from the
Gregorian calendar which was in use in the West in 1917.
The old style Julian calendar which the Russians used was
thirteen days behind the Gregorian.

Spelling of Russian

names will be the generally accepted American version.

CHAPTER I
UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE MARCH REVOLUTION
Diplomacy between countries is formulated by the
leaders.

Each leader is guided by his representatives in

foreign countries who send reports back to their capitals
for analysis.

In the case of United States-Russian rela-

tions, the reports from the representatives of the United
States in Russia, added to public opinion at home, helped
President Woodrow Wilson formulate a basic attitude toward
the Russian government founded in March, 1917.

By March,

he was drawing closer to committing the United States to
join the Allies in the fight against Germany.

The overthrow

of Tsardom and the formation of the new Russian representative government were more compatible with President Wilson's
pre-formed philosophy of eradicating imperialism from the
capitalist system.
In order to understand the United States' relations
with the Russian Provisional Government, it is necessary to
analyze briefly the man most responsible for the development
of these relations:

David R. Francis, the United States

Ambassador to Petrograd.
as a public servant:

David Francis had a long history

Mayor of St. Louis (1885-1889), Gov-

ernor of Missouri (1889-1893), Secretary of the Interior
(1896-1897), and President of the Universal Exposition of
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1904, as well as having had a long career as a businessman.
George Kennan was dubious about why Mr. Francis was selected (29:35); his experience in foreign affairs had not been
evident previouslyo
When Ambassador Francis arrived at Petrograd, Russia,
in 1916, he was greeted by Tsarist Russia with her expensive
and royal atmosphere, something to which a Missouri boy was
not accustomedo

Francis' British and French counterparts

were much more at home in the refinement of the Russian
Court.

One can scarcely wonder at Francis' boyish excite-

ment over being the first major Ambassador to recognize the
newly created Provisional Government upon the fall of Tsardom.

Francis' close relationship with this government formed

the foundation of United States-Russian relations from March
through November of 1917.
Continuing war brought internal disorder and economic crisis to Russia in March, 1917.
to be an inadequate leader of Russiao

The Tsar had proved
Francis sent numerous

telegrams to Secretary of State Robert Lansing describing
the turmoil existing in Petrograd and throughout Russia.
Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador to Russia, supported Francis' descriptions of the poor economic conditions
and lack of government coordination in the war effort when
he cabled the British Foreign Office (5:57).
In his communications to Lansing, Francis described

8

the progress of the revolution and the way the Duma was able
to wrestle control of the government from the Romanovs, the
Russian Imperial family.

The first telegrams from Ambassa-

dor Francis displayed very little emotion; they were mostly
businesslike descriptions of the events as he saw them.
On March 15, Roland

s.

Morris, United States representative

in Sweden, cabled a copy of an official statement by the
Russian Telegram Bureau accounting for the disruption in
the Russian government.

It explained that the Duma replaced

the Imperial family as head of the government.

The cable

went on to say that life had almost returned to normal in
Petrograd (61:861.00/275).

Morris, having the advantage of

viewing from afar, was better able to interpret objectively
the internal chaos than Francis, who was directly involved.
Prince Lvov was named to head the newly created
Provisional Government as Minister of Interior and President
of Ministers.

Pavel Nikolayevich Milyukov, a well-known

Russian historian and statesman, headed the Department of
Foreign Affairs.

On March 15, 1917, Tsar Nicholas abdica-

ted the throne for himself and his young son in favor of
his brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich.

Michael,

however, refused to rule Russia, which left the Duma in
control of establishing Russia's first representative
government.

Francis reported these events without fanfare,

although he did mention that the Duma and committees of
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workingmen disagreed on the kind of government to be established.
United States recognition of the Russian Provisional
Government proved to be the highlight of David Francis'
career as Ambassador to Russia.

He was elated over being

the first Ambassador to recognize the new government.

This

early emotional involvement caused Francis to feel he had
to retain his faith in the Provisional Government, even
when that faith was not warranted.

On March 18, 1917, Mr.

Francis requested permission from the State Department to
be the first to recognize the Provisional Government.

He

claimed that this first recognition was important to help
stabilize the new government and ensure its participation
in the war.

He went on to say:

This revolution is the practical realization of that
principle of Government which we have championed and
advocated, I mean Government by consent of the governed. Our recognition will have a stupendous moral
effect especially if given first (61:861.00/282).
In later years, Francis re-enacted his role in the recognition of the new government with great pride in the ovation
he received at the recognition ceremony (18:110).

Lansing

wired back permission for Francis to extend United States
formal recognition of the Russian Government and Francis
acted immediately by meeting with Foreign Minister Milyukov
at eleven a.m. on March 22.

He emphasized to Lansing that
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he extended the recognition hours before the British and
French.
British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan, like Francis,
was interested in immediate recognition of the Provisional
Government, but he insisted that Milyukov give assurance of
Russia's willingness to continue the war to a successful conclusion (5:90).

Buchanan was much more cautious than Francis

in his view of the new Russian Ministers; he felt that they
would prove to be too weak and that the strong man needed for
an efficient organization of the government was not to be
found in the existing Ministry (5:108).

As to the actual

recognition of the government, Buchanan followed Francis by
forty-eight hours.

He mentioned that Francis was very proud

of being the first to recognize the new government (5:91).
Secretary of State Lansing and Ambassador Francis
had been less than enthusiastic about the Romanov government.
Lansing wrote President Wilson of his impression that the
Russian Imperial Court had divided loyalties between the
Allies and the Germans, as they were of German descent, and
now the new government would be an Ally (61:861.00/273).
Francis' support of the Provisional Government continued to
grow partly because of his desire that the government be
successful and partly to insure Russia's continuance in the
war.

He believed that the government was occupied by just

and honest representatives of all the people who would

11
govern with compassion for freedom and democracy.

Atrium-

phant ending to the war was the only way for the Russian
experiment in democracy to survive.
Socialist parties were strong in Russia at this
time.

Francis described the socialist demands as "rot" and

simultaneously lauded the outstanding qualifications of the
government ministers (18:70-71).

Francis recognized the

potential strength of the socialist element, but failed to
see its direct threat to the Provisional Government and its
eventual support from the Russian people.

A strong social-

ist element in Russia was recognized by Roland Morris in
Sweden.

As early as March 24, 1917, he observed that embar-

rassment would befall the Allies if a socialist government
was established in Russia.

He even said that the Stockholm

press was aware of the stronger socialist party in competition with a weaker Duma (63:861.00/300).

Socialist power

was evident by the number of established socialist parties,
but they were not prepared in March for the sudden fall of
the Tsarist monarchy.

Many of the non-socialist groups had

participated in the old government and were thus in a better
position to take command of the new one.
Conditions in Russia at the time of the March Revolution were very confusing.

Food was scarce in the cities,

not because it was not available, but because the transportation system in Russia was so poorly organized that food
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could not be moved from the farms to the cities.
of rioting and land-grabbing were widespread.

Reports

Even the

troops were reported to be impatient to join in the free
land grab.

David R. Maggowan, the Vice-Consul in Moscow,

reported that soldiers and workers were refusing in large
numbers to return to the war front and to the factories,
and instead were increasing the danger of a debacle.

A

class struggle over the land question was eminent, advised
Maggowan (63:861.00/337).

Maddin Summers, Consul in Moscow,

collaborated with the report of poor conditions concerning
food and transportation in Russia (63:861.00/337).

The

American Consul in Petrograd, North Winship, reported the
deteriorating conditions in Petrograd and the surrounding
area.

He warned that if the food problem was not relieved

at once, the government would become more socialist (63:
861.00/330).

On March 27, he elaborated on the strength of

the Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputieso

Soldiers

refused to take orders from former Imperial officers and
many workers abstained from working.

They were interested

in a speedy conclusion to the war (63:861.00/370).

Despite

the reports of confusion, the Russian populace generally
supported the revolution and were helpful in overthrowing
the Tsar.

As time neared November, the workers and soldiers

became disillusioned with the slowness of the revolution
and again turned to violence as they had in July.
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Looking through the eyes of David Francis, one
sees a different picture of these conditions.

Francis

continued to send cables to Lansing reporting the improved
conditions in Petrograd and the growing strength of the
Provisional Government.

He was concerned with two things:

keeping Russia in the war, and improving the United States
relationship with Russia.

William Phillips, Assistant Sec-

retary of State, reported receiving a telegram from Francis
saying that financial aid to Russia at this time would be
a "master stroke" (69:861.51/129).

Francis alluded to the

potential danger of the socialist element, but concluded
this message with a reassuring statement as to the improving
conditions.

Letters from Samuel Gompers and other labor

leaders would be helpful in quieting the socialists, suggested Francis (63:861.00/299).
State Department reaction was generally based on
communications from Franciso

Although Morris and Winship,

among others, frequently disagreed with Francis' descriptions of Russia's internal conditions, the State Department
continued to believe Francis and disregard the others.

An

overwhelming desire on the part of Wilson and Lansing to
see the war concluded with a German defeat and a victory
for democracy closed their eyes to the true picture of
Russia.

They misunderstood the deep wishes of the Russian

people to stop a war they felt was a conflict between
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imperialistic countries; the people wanted to turn to
the century-late task of making secure their freedom and
projected equality.

Francis was delighted to gain impor-

tance in a country that had previously had little to offer
American diplomatso

This enchantment with the Provisional

Government blinded him to existing conditions and allowed
him to continue from March to November supporting the various Provisional Governments despite the obviously growing
anti-government feeling.

The desire of the official United

States government to secure Russia's perseverance in the
war against German autocracy contributed to the eventual
ascent of Bolshevism in Russia.
Public reaction to the overthrow of Russia's monarchy was for the most part like that of the State Department:
enthusiastic.

The

~

York Times ran front page articles

on March 16, telling of the revolutionary events.

Their

account runs parallel to Ambassador Francis' statement,
reporting that Tsar Nicholas was a "man of excellent intentions, but vacillating resolutions, 11 "the revolution was
well prepared," and, "the city is now quiet and perfect
order prevails" (41:16th/1,2).

The Times emphasized that

the newly created Russian government would not give Germany
an advantage; the Russian people would want to maintain
their freedom through a successful prosecution of the war.
"It is only through victory that Russia's long sought prize
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of access to unfrozen seas can be won" (41:16th/10).

It

was this statement of implied imperialistic gain through
war that would later become a strong socialist argument for
abandoning the war.
Reactions from other news media were very similar
to that of the

~

York Times.

~

World said the revolu-

tion marked the passing of an old regime, whereas the New
York Tribune related that Russia would have a full constitutional form of government with a military responsible to
the citizenry (57:799-800).

The unification of the Allied

cause for democracy against Germany became evident, reported
the Dallas News (15:885-86)0
The view that the Russian March Revolution resulted
in unity for the Allies and enlightened democratic government for Russia was further popularized in periodical
articles.

"The revolution in Russia has given absolute

guarantee of the unity of the Allied cause to the end,"
wrote the Nation (40:330).

Paul Wharton, giving an eye-

witness account in the Atlantic Monthly, said, "I am happy,
very happy, for I believe that one of the great spiritual
victories of mankind has been won during this bewildering
week."

Mr. Wharton went on to say that Russia would be

the center of culture of the future (75:30).

After only

one week of complete chaos and confusion, it seems rather
optimistic to make the statement that Russia, a country
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locked in archaic autocracy for hundreds of years, would
suddenly emerge as an enlightened cultural center.
Few people saw doubt or evil in the March revolution; most were searching for a just reason to support the
Allied cause.

The fall of Russian autocracy, the only

chink in the Allied political armor, gave the American
people the needed impetus to join in the Allied cause for
defeat of German militarism.

There were some people, how-

ever, who doubted the success of the Russian revolution;
one such person was Alexander Petrunkevitch, zoologist and
President of the Executive Committee of the Federation of
Russian Organizations in America, an anti-Bolshevik organization.

Writing in the Yale Review, Petrunkevitch expressed

doubt as to whether the revolution had actually accomplished
what appeared on the surface to be democracyo

Revolutions

take a long time, they are not concluded in a week, nor can
one predict the outcome in so short a time.

Mr. Petrunke-

vi tch went on to say the socialists looked upon the revolution as social rather than political; this was something
most other observers failed to see or report.

He pointed

out that there was a need for all European countries to
follow suit and change with the times lest they be left
with "time-worn ideals" (46:838-855).

America and the

Allies were too busy rejoicing over the new-found justification for a complete victory over Germany to heed the

17

warning of doubt concerning the claimed success of the
Russian revolution.

People wanted the revolution to be

successful, and therefore refused to look beyond a very
transparent framework of Russian democracy.

Had the Allies

realized the eventual danger in tying their cause to the
Russian revolution and insisting on Russian continuance in
that cause, they might have taken an alternate path to
Germany's ruin.
Optimism regarding the Russian revolution continued
with confidence invested in Prince Lvov.

He was claimed to

be the most popular man in Russia; in fact he was the only
man the Russians were willing to trust as leader of the new
governmento

The New York Times reported that in the first

week, the Tsar's name was deleted from church services
(41:3).

Gerald Morgan wrote in the North American Review

that the war was a war for the people, not for nationalistic interests nor dynasties; thus he supplemented the New
York Times' article in showing the growing rejection of
Tsarist ways (36:502-10).

G. J. Sosnowsky, an American

citizen, was not to be outdone when he said that Russia
was to become "the world's foremost democracy" (52:536).
This short review of articles on Russia's revolution shows
only a few opinions on the subject.

Many other people

had their say concerning the Russian events, including
Jews, newspaper editors, the general public and Congress.
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Reluctance to give wholehearted support was the
character of those few people that uttered words of caution
about Russia.

The "wait and see" attitude was the most

popular view among the so-called opposition.

Very few

people in America understood the meaning and desires of
the socialist parties in Russia; consequently their view
was limited to past history.

However, H. W. Nevinson,

writing in Contemporary Review, did warn that danger might
arise from the non-compromising principles of political
theory inherent in the radical socialist parties such as
the Social Democrats (39:409-18).

The New Republic was more

candid in its belief that Russia was a giant, free to wander
in Asia without restraint.

It even suggested that a defeated

Germany would be unable to deter Russia from advancing into
Western Europe (33:214-15).

Dr. A. Coralnik, American corre-

spondent of the Bourse Gazette of Petrograd, disagreed with
the New Republic's view of an unrestrained Russiao

He saw

Russia as a peace-loving democracy with nothing to demand
of her neighbors (41:25th/E-2).

Fear that the revolution

was far from over existed among some people, noted the
~Times

(41:17th/3).

~

Again these views were not typical;

rather, they displayed the lack of unquestioned confidence
exhibited by the general public.
Of all the interest groups in the United States, the
Jews probably had more direct interest in the revolution
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than anyone.

For years the Jews had been discriminated

against under Tsarist rule, and as a result, many fled to
the United States.

Naturally they felt a keen interest and

delight at the fall of the Romanovs.

The Jews viewed the

revolution as a liberal movement and thought their position
in Russia and throughout the world would be advanced.
~

The

York Times reported a mass meeting of Jewish refugees to

cheer the new government, for which 8,000 tickets had been
sold (41:20th/2).

Herman Berstein, editor of The American

Hebrew, conveyed that the revolution could possibly result
in the "eventual building up of a great empire of the
people," meaning Jews (41:16th/4).

Many Jewish refugees

would turn to Russia upon hearing the news of the revolution, said Dr. Israel Friedlander, professor of Biblical
Literature at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America
(41:25th/E-3)o

Abraham Cahan, editor of the Jewish Daily

Forward, wrote, "We no longer distinguish between the Russian government and the Russian people; both are one in soul
and spirit: we now love both" (17:15-16).

Jewish enthusiasm

was great indeed; it is understandable to rejoice and see
only the good when viewing the fall of an enemy.

Neverthe-

less, this did not excuse the failure of the Jewish community
to realize that pogroms in Russia needed the active support
from many people outside of the government.

The collapse of

a government does not cleanse away basic feelings and
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prejudices of people; they remain, latent though they may
be, to become active at a later date.
Editorial comments in the highly respected

New~

Times gave evidence of wishful thinking rather than scholarly analysis.

On March 24, eight days after Tsar Nicholas

abdicated, the Times said in an editorial that the Russian
Church called for the people to be loyal to the government.
The Times claimed this was a good sign, and went further by
saying that the socialists in Russia were "an insignificant
fraction of the population" (41:23rd/8).

Both statements,

in light of future events, proved to be naive at best.

An

editorial in The Independent was more cautious, but concluded that the results of the revolution would be permanent,
meaning Tsardom was to be no more (56:525).
By no means were the New York Times editors guilty
of perpetrating a false view to the public, because the
public had already drawn the same enthusiastic opinion of
the revolutiono

Individual travelers in Russia brought back

the view that the Russian army was in complete support of
the new government.

To add to the already glazed public

conception of the revolution, a United States government
economic advisor and member of the Institute of Government
Research, N. I. Stone, Ph.D., claimed that the Russian
people were basically a democratic people.

He said that

Russia was "ripe for a republican form of government" in
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comparison to past revolutionary countries (41:25th/2).
Simon Bass represented public reaction by writing to the
~York

Times that America should be happy for Russia's

new opportunity for freedom and to thank the Times for
bringing the public the good news (41:22nd/10).
The State Department was not without a share of
public opinion of the March Revolution.

Many cables and

letters were received indicating individual and group
excitement over the revolution.

Some went so far as to

send congratulatory letters to the new government in Russia.
Typical among the reactions received by the State Department was Oscar

s.

Straus' thanks to Secretary Lansing for

seeing that the United States was the first to recognize
the newsly created Russian government (63:861.00/314).

The

State Department forwarded some of the reactions to Ambassador Francis for further distribution in appropriate Russian
circles.
Congress was not to be outdone by the public nor
the State Department in their joyous acceptance of the new
democracyo

Action taken by Congress was very limited, which

is understandable since the State Department handles most
foreign relations matters.

A few resolutions passed both

Houses congratulating the Russian people and promising brotherly help when needed.

Isaac Siegel, in answer to the

pacifists' opposition in the United States, read George
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Kennan's (relative of George F. Kennan) statement that
America should now join the Allies and fight for freedom
in Europe.

Kennan said liberty in Russia was not won by

pacifists, nor would be European liberty (7:1035).
Bankers sensed a new market in Russia for money
dealings.

Most bankers were excited over the new, basi-

cally untouched money market.

Loans to the new Russian

government would be made more readily availableo

Some

bankers were hesitant to float loans at first, or at least
until the government took on a more stable character (41:
17th/16).

Nevertheless, bankers seemed to be in general

agreement that Russia provided a largely untapped economic
sourceo

Even though this first reaction was optimistic for

Russia, it did not materialize in large loans for her in the
remaining time before the Bolshevik takeover.
For the most part, the American reaction to the
Russian revolution was enthusiastic and supporting.

On the

contrary, the Russians were less enthusiastic, and in many
cases, gave only qualified support.

Naturally there were

those who considered the Provisional Government a godsend,
but many took the "wait and see" attitudeo

The socialist

parties in general were not opposed to the new government,
but they recommended that their followers only support those
governmental programs that were consistent with party policy.
Lenin led the anti-government forces with his April
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thesis: no support to the Provisional Government.

At this

time, however, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were not in.fluential
compared to the much larger and more popular groups of
Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

Lenin said the gov-

ernment still had imperialistic aspirations of territorial
gain (4:1203).

Izvestiia, organ of the Workers' and Sol-

dier's Deputies, represented the most powerful organized
group in Petrograd, and their support, badly needed by the
government, was qualified.

At first they refused to sanction

fellow socialists joining the Provisional Government; later
they relented and let them join but only after creating a
committee "to watch over the acts of the Provisional Government" (4:125-26).

Four days later, on March 20, they called

for the Russian people to continue to agitate and keep the
revolution going (4:195).

The underlying idea to this was

that the people, not the Provisional Government, must continue the re-organization of Russia and control their own
futures.

An editorial in Den, a socialist newspaper, said

they would oppose any "Chauvinistic, nationalistic, and
imperialistic words, thoughts, or deeds" from any source.
They did give support to the Provisional Government; however, they retained the right to criticize any wrong acts
of the government (4:144).

Other newspapers, such as the

Rabochaia Gazeta, of the Social Democratic Party (Menshevik),
and the Delo Naroda, of the Socialist Revolutionary Party,
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said they would support the Provisional Government as long
as it agreed with their actions.
There were those, such as the conservative paper
Novoe Vremia, who gave unqualified support to the Provisional Government.

It said as early as March 18 that the

newly created government was "the legitimate expression of
the entire people's will" (4:141).

"Izvestiia" Revoliut-

sionnoi Nedeli, not to be confused with Izvestiia, called
for governmental support by the people to aid the success
of the revolution (4:136).

~' organ of the Constitu-

tional Party Democrats, gave its support to the government
and called the revolution the eighth wonder of the world
(4:143).
The Provisional Government had an enormous task
ahead of itself uniting all of Russia's people, and the
war with Germany was just an added problem with which to
contend.

Rather than withdraw from the war, its biggest

problem, the Provisional Government chose to dedicate
itself to a more vigorous prosecution of the war and to
bring it to a prompt and just conclusion.
made its aims public on March 20 in the
government newspaper, declaring,

11

The government

!o y.

~o'

the

the Government will make

every effort to provide our army with everything necessary
to bring the war to a victorious conclusion" (4:157).
tion of the various interest groups in Russia was along

Reac-
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party lines.

The strongly socialist groups tended to

oppose the continuation of the war; some said that if the
war must be continued, then eliminate the imperialistic
goals.

Conservative parties were in favor of supporting

the Allied cause; the Cadets called for government support
to repel the external enemy (4:1199).
Support of the Provisional Government was not
always contingent on the composition of the government,
but rather on its stand on certain key problems existing
within Russia.

One such problem was moneyo

The government

needed the cooperation of the manufacturers, whereas the
socialist elements were demanding more control of factories
by the workers.

Another issue was the association of the

Church with the State; Izvestiia was quite emphatic in
insisting that there be a complete separation of Church and
State (4:812).

Some Americans were pleased when the Russian

Churches supported the Provisional Government, thinking the
churches represented popular opinion.
Probably the most applause the Provisional Government received in its short life was for the abolishment of
the death penalty for military crimes.

The newspapers rang

with praise for the government for eliminating an old Tsarist tool.

This act proved to be dangerous and the penalty

was eventually restored with the agreement of Ambassador
Fra:nciso
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Alexander Kerensky re-wrote his memoirs in 1965,
Russia and History's Turning Point, in which he expressed
strong feelings concerning the first moments of the Provisional Government.

He described the immediate confusion

and physical reaction of the public upon receiving the news
of the fall of the Tsar.

At first the people reacted vio-

lently against old Tsarist officials and landlords, but
Kerensky said they ceased this disruptive behavior when all
Russia realized that the fall of the Tsar meant the realization of a life-long dream--freedom (30:218).
With the forming of the Provisional Government,
Kerensky was the only socialist appointed to the Ministry.
His first-hand experience in the early days of the revolution gave him an insight to the government that no other
person could claim.

Prince Lvov, the President of the

first Ministry, had been criticized for being weak; however,
Kerensky defended him as having complete faith in Russia's
capacity to develop a democracy (30:220).
Kerensky wrote that the Russian people turned to
the task of building a new life with great enthusiasm
(30:230).

He was confident in the people's capacity to

withstand all the pressures brought to bear as a result of
the years of political inactivity.

This was evidenced by

the government's inclusion of a variety of political parties in the Ministry.

Kerensky was concerned because the
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Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies had reservations
about endorsing any Cabinet members but Kerensky as Minister
of Justice.

This showed the potential danger to the Provi-

sional Government which proved to be an unfortunate reality
(30:234).
Kerensky felt the Provisional Government had four
major tasks to accomplish.

In order of importance, they

were:
( 1) To continue the defense of the country;
( 2 ) To reestablish a working administrative apparatus throughout the country;
(3) To carry out a number of basic political and
social reforms;
(4) To prepare the way for the transformation of
Russia from a highly centralized state into a federal
state (30:219).
Making the war the government's top priority was a mistake.
Kerensky still believes, however, as he related in his memoirs, that the government was generally popular and had the
interests of the people at heart.

He also believed that

the people, for the most part, supported the government.
The socialist parties gave their support to the
government as long as it followed their ideas; the Workmen's
and Soldiers' Soviet announced at the beginning that they
were not going to follow the government blindly and that
drastic changes must be made before Russia could hope to
attain a democratic state.

If the war must be continued,

then all imperialistic war aims must be renounced, insisted
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many socialist newspapers.

This needed change was never

fully recognized by United States authorities.

By November,

the cry for Russian withdrawal from the war grew louder,
while the American effort to keep Russia fighting became
more intense.

The rest of this paper will deal with United

States attempts to keep Russia in the war despite the logic
against such a course of action.

CHAPTER II
DIPLOMACY:

APRIL, MAY AND JUNE

During a three month period, April, May and June,
the Russian Provisional Government had great difficulties
maintaining stability and seeking cooperation among the
political parties in Russia.
a leader.

The government was lacking

Alexander Kerensky was slow in moving up the

ladder of governmental importance, and at this time he was
not able to exercise the degree of guiding leadership that
was needed in that time of turmoil.
Using the Russian Revolution as a final justification for United States entrance to the World War, Woodrow
Wilson committed himself and the country to encouraging
Russian efforts against Germany.

He wanted the Allies to

win a victory for democracy and everlasting peaceo

As a

result, most United States government officials were so
busy trying to keep Russia fighting that they were blind
to the internal disorder and public dissatisfaction with
the entire war.

The socialists were able to capitalize on

this unrest among the people; when the Provisional Government insisted on continuing the war, they presented the
side of the people.

This period, April through June, was

the beginning of the United States misunderstanding of the
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Russian people's desire to conclude the war, or else to
repudiate the imperialistic goals of the Allies.
The first move the Provisional Government had to
make to continue the war effort and maintain general stability was to secure a large loan from the United States.
Ambassador Francis was very anxious to assist the government in its efforts.

He wired Secretary of State Lansing

that since the United States had loaned five hundred million dollars to both France and Great Britain, the Russians
would be insulted if they were not given the same amount.
Francis assured Lansing that Russia was abundantly rich in
natural resources so the loan would be "absolutely safe"
(69:861.51/133).

Within seven days, on April 13, Secretary

of the Treasury William McAdoo, via Lansing, assured Francis
that Congress would approve loans for those countries willing to continue the fight against the common enemy (69:
861051/133).

He was saying that if Russia did not fight,

she would not receive financial aid from the United States.
Russia's need for money or credit was painfully
obvious.

Her railroad system was confused for the most

part, but more important, she was lacking locomotives and
boxcars.

The government had also been trying desperately

to buy guns from the Remington Company, but did not have
adequate credit.

Francis talked to the Russian Minister

of Finance on April 20 and told him no loans would be

31
forthcoming unless the Russians continued to fight.

The

Minister agreed that there would be no separate peace
(69:861.51/134)0
Discussions concerning American loans to Russia
continued for the remaining seven months with Francis promising the State Department that Russia was quite capable
of paying back a loan.

The Treasury Department finally

secured the loan and authorized Russian credit in the
United States up to one hundred million dollars.

Francis

reported that the Minister of Finance feared the United
States would loan money to Russia through Great Britain,
and he said the Russians would be insulted if this were
the case (69:861.51/140).

Finally, the United States con-

tinued to push Francis to inform the Provisional Government
that the loan was contingent on their continued war effort.
It is interesting to note that North Winship,
United States Consul in Petrograd, said the Russian people
had no faith in their economy; the people were trying desperately to sell all possessions.

Winship felt that a loan

was needed to prevent economic chaos rather than preserve
the fighting force (63:861.00/439,435).
The Petrograd Soviet debated long and hard whether
to back the government's bid for the American Liberty Loan;
with reluctance, they finally agreed to support the governmento

Once again, the Soviet hesitated to uphold the Allies
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because of their imperialistic war aims.

Their consent to

the loan was to aid the government to throw off the bonds
of imperialism and seek only revolutionary objectives.
Money was borrowed, stated the Provisional Government, to aid in defeating Germany; the responsibility of
every citizen was to help in this effort (4:486).

~' a

socialist newspaper, said the loan was only good as long
as the government realized that annexations were out of
the question (4:486).

Again, the Russian attention focused

on the Allied war objectives; dissatisfaction with these
objectives was strong in the socialist parties, but little
was done by the United States to calm this unrest.
The American view of the Provisional Government and
its degree of popular support was developed by Ambassador
Francis.

He continued to send back reports telling of the

improved conditions and of the many people who spoke of supporting the Provisional Government.

He described the enthu-

siastic crowds that gathered at the American Embassy and his
patriotic speeches to them.

Although Francis rarely studied

the socialist mind and never tried to understand the desires
of those seeking a separate peace, he did find time to discuss opposition to the Bolshevikso

Winship reported on

April 30 that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers• Deputies
strongly denounced Lenin, the Bolshevik leader; they believed
he was dangerous to their membership (63:861.00/386).

This
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certainly satisfied Francis and indicated that the most
powerful Soviet in Russia supported the governmento
It appears that the State Department's view of the
popularity of the Provisional Government was fairly accurate
because most Petrograd papers pleaded at the beginning for
government support from the people.

Even Izvestiia, tool of

the Workmen's and Soldiers• Soviet, called for the people to
uphold the government for fear that opposition would cause
riots and disorder that might lead to the end of the Revolution (4:1241).

Izvestiia asked the soldiers not to carry

their weapons during the June demonstration (4:1323).

There

was criticism, much of the time, concerning the Bolsheviks
and their aspirations of complete government control.

The

government continued to receive backing from the nonsocialist parties as long as they carried on an aggressive
military campaign against Germany.
Support of the Provisional Government diminished
as the months passed.

Each party had its own "ax to grind,"

and the government appeared to be the grinding wheel.

North

Winship, Consul in Petrograd, reported that the people were
in strong opposition to the way the government was handling
the war.

Many protested the offensive against Germany;

others rebelled against the war and cried for an end to the
fighting.

Winship described newspaper articles telling the

people the only way that land reform and other revolutionary
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ideas could be accomplished was for the war to end (63:
861.00/435).

Some papers even accused Alexander Kerensky,

Acting Minister of War, of fighting on the offensive, in
essence, causing the war to spread and postponing the day
of peace (63:861000/435).
Maddin Summers, Consul in Moscow, sent to Washington a copy of an open letter to Frank L. Polk, Assistant
Secretary of State, from a Petrograd official criticizing
the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies for accusing nongovernmental backing by the people (63:861.00/403!).

Ano-

ther Consulate, John A. Ray in Odessa, reported that the
peasants were not supporting the government.

He said the

peasants had deserted the Zemstvo organizations--formerly
the main representative body in the rural areas--because
the land owners controlled them.

Many peasants were form-

ing their own organizations in opposition to the Zemstvos
(63:861.00/401).

Ray pointed out later that many of the

regions were calling for local autonomy and independence
(63:861.00/410)0
Reports continued to come into the State Department
from Russia describing the deteriorating conditions.

They

explained how the socialist elements were becoming more
aggressive toward the government.

The workers were making

excessive demands of their employers and refusing to work
unless their demands were met.

The government was almost
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powerless to meet this resistance with concentrated
authority; one reason for this weakness was the lack of
socialist ministers.

Only Alexander Kerensky served in

the government from the powerful Council of Workmen's
and Soldiers' Deputies; the Council was opposed to any
other members joining the government (63:861.00/404), thus
perpetrating the division of power within Russia.

Even

Kerensky admitted in 1927 that the open hatred of Minister
Milyukov by the Petrograd Soviet was detrimental to the
government's existence and showed the "lack of confidence"
in the government.

This confidence had to be restored if

the government could hope to survive (31:132-33).
To make matters worse, the Bolsheviks were planning a mass demonstration against the government in June.
Lenin had arrived in Russia two months earlier, in April,
and had been preaching to the workers to agitate against
the existing government whenever possible; he appealed to
the workers to elect their own kind to office and help end
the war.

The cry for a mass demonstration was made on

June 10 by a Bolshevik bulletin calling for soldiers and
workers to join hands and support their local Soviets.
They used the slogan "Bread! Peace! Liberty!" to good advantage (4:1312).

The Petrograd Soviet was in opposition to

the Bolsheviks, and they pleaded for the workers to avoid
demonstrations, especially armed demonstrations (4:1313).
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Antagonism toward the government mounted steadily
month after month as the war grew and Allied pressure to
continue fighting grew more intense.
role, if not

~

The war played a major

major role, in the eventual collapse of the

Provisional. Government.
President Woodrow Wilson developed his international
political. philosophy prior to the first Russian Revolution
in 1917.

He was concerned with the existing world unrest,

and, as he indicated in his famous Fourteen Point speech on
January 8, 1918, he wished to see order result from the
European conflict.

N. Gordon Levin devoted the first two

chapters in Woodrow

Wilson~

World Politics to the idea

that President Wilson was basically anti-imperialist and
hoped to change existing European imperialist goals by reform
rather than revolution.

According to Levin, Wilson justified

the war against Germany as a war of liberal reform.

In other

words, if Germany was defeated, imperialism would be weakened and a progressive attitude toward international relations would emerge, led by the omnipotent United States
economic power.

Therefore, when the Russian Revolution

created a liberal form of government in Petrograd, it gave
Wilson the final reason to implement his international philosophy, to assist a liberal Russia in her fight against
imperialism (32:Ch. I,II).
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Robert Lansing also saw the connection between the
Revolution and the American crusade to save the world for
democracy.

Woodrow Wilson included Russia in his war

address when he said:
Does not every American feel that assurance has been
added to our hope for the future peace of the world by
the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? • • • Here
is a fit partner for a League of Honor (1:512).
Subsequently, the United States embarked on one of history's most famous crusades.

One hardly has to wonder why

Russia's continuance in the war was so important to the
United States:

Russia represented the new democracy, the

embryo of a new world of peace and freedom led by the
greatest democracy of them all--the United States.

David

R. Francis and many other Americans were so caught up in
the fast pace of saving the world that they did not have
time to analyze situations and determine whether each
country wanted to be "saved" by the United States.
The Provisional Government policy was made public
on April 9, declaring that Russia would work closely with
the Allies and seek a just peace with no annexations and
with "self-determination of peoples" (4:1046).

Iv'Iilyukov's

successor, Minister Terestchenko, reiterated these governmental objectives on several occasions.

He emphasized that

Russia would not seek a separate peace; this was most
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gratifying to Ambassador Francis, who was in daily contact
with Terestchenko.

As expected, the right-wing newspapers

supported the government's announcement.
The army was not as zealous as the government.

Mad-

din Summers reported newspaper articles in Moscow described
the poor conditions and morale in the army, and said that
reinforcement troops for the front lines were deserting en
masse (63:861.00/406)0

A. F. Kerensky, the new Minister of

War and Navy, made an emotional appeal on May 25 to the soldiers to continue fighting and save the revolution (4:936).
Many newspapers in Petrograd supported Kerensky's call for a
new June offensiveo

There was disagreement as to who should

control the offensive; the military interest pressured the
government for control, and this resulted in a certain
amount of confusion.

Roland Morris in Sweden related Prince

Lvov's request that the Provisional Government be given full
control of the army if they were expected to be responsible
for the well being of the country (63:861.00/355).

This

disruption and confusion about the control of the army
continued until the Bolsheviks took over in November.

Disci-

pline was almost non-existent in the army; the men in the
ranks demanded new powers over their officers as guaranteed
by the revolution.

This helped feed the disruptive confu-

sion and led to inadequate execution of duties.
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President Wilson sent messages to Russia on different occasions explaining that this was not a war for
territorial or monetary gain, but for saving democracyo
Russia was very important to the war, said Colonel Edward
House, friend and confidant of Wilson's; and the United
States could not spend enough to help her (50:25).

Wilson's

interest in Russia was evidenced by his actions toward the
socialistso

He refused to stop the socialists in the United

States from attending a gathering in Stockholm, and in addition, he used his position to try to influence a court case
in California involving a socialist, Thomas Jo Mooney, who
had allegedly thrown a bomb during a Preparedness Day parade
on July 22, 1916.

Wilson told California Governor William

D. Stephens that a sentence commuted to life would aid the
United States internationally (1:65-66).

Wilson never

really displayed much understanding of the Russian socialist movement, nor did many Americans.
Propaganda played a positive role in United StatesRussian relations; the United States sent missions, films,
and other forms of informational propaganda to Russia.
Secretary Lansing and Ambassador Francis were in agreement
to encourage President Wilson to continue distributing
information to Russia.

Francis frequently asked for clari-

fication of United States war aims and for statements from
the President to encourage the Russian government to fight
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on.

The aforementioned individual missions will be dis-

cussed in the next chapter.
Propaganda, intentional or otherwise, did not stop
with the State Department; many private citizens sent
letters to Russia and called for films depicting the United
States efforts to help mankind.

Most of these offers, how-

ever, were channelled through the State Department.
leader Samuel Gompers wrote to

~"'rancis,

Labor

saying that the

American workers were rejoicing because their Russian
counterparts had finally attained freedom.

But he warned

that it was impossible to achieve all goals immediately
(63:861.00/389).

Another example of private citizen ini-

tiative was H. M. Edmunds, who requested permission from
President Wilson to show movies in Russia depicting German
mistreatment of Russian soldiers (67:861.4061/3).

Many

other examples may be cited, but let it suffice to say
that many Americans were involved in encouraging Russia
to remain in the war--whether she wanted to or not.
The socialists viewed the war with far less enthusiasm than the Provisional Government or the United States.
In fact, the socialists read into President Wilson's messages the approval of annexations and other imperialistic
attitudes.

North Winship reported that the Social Democrats

(Maximalist) claimed Allied war aims in "absolute opposition"
to the Russian war aims (63:861.00/438).

From Odessa, John
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A. Ray pointed out that when the United States entered the
war, the Russians lost faith in Wilson's objectivity (63:
861000/446).

More importantly, the strongest opposition

to the Provisional Government, the Council of Workmen's
and Soldiers' Deputies, was emphatic in refuting Wilson
and the Russian government.

They said the socialist move-

ment was growing throughout the world and the only way for
victory was a united struggle of working men against imperialism (63:861.00/438).

The desire for a separate peace

or a change in the Allied war aims was presented to the
State Department, but it refused to act in the face of
the contradicting reports from Francis and others to come.
David Francis, for the most part, reported the
internal conditions of Russia to be improving.

He held

daily conferences with Provisional Government officials
and seemed to be convinced by their reports, as he always
concluded that conditions were improving.

At one time,

in a letter to Foreign Minister Milyukov on April 15, he
went so far as to claim that Russia had always been democratic at heart (18:96-97).
Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to Russia,
took a much more pessimistic view of the Provisional Government.

He did not see the basic Russian desire for

democracy as did Francis, nor did he see any substantial
reason for a Russian offensive in the spring (5:113-14).
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In writing to the British Foreign Office, Buchanan said he
could not share the same confidence in the Russian Ministry
that Francis indicated in his letters to Lansing (5:115).
According to Buchanan, the Germans proved to be a nearly
insurmountable foe for the weak and disorganized Russian
armyo

At this point in time, April, 1917, Buchanan and

Francis represented opposite Allied views of the Provisional Government.

North Winship, Roland Morris and Maddin

Summers agreed with Buchanan, seeing the government as less
than adequate.
One of the most pressing problems of the Provisional
Government was that of land reform.

The peasant had the

bonds of serfdom lifted fifty-six years earlier, but what
good was their freedom without land?

The immediate reac-

tion of the peasants to the downfall of the Tsarist monarchy
was to grab and divide the land of the large estate owners.
The Provisional Government delayed this action by promising
that the proposed Constitutional Assembly would deal equitably with the land question; but patience had been worn
thin by years of waitingo

Izvestiia was critical of the

government's nebulous statements concerning land; it called
for an affirmative stand on the problem (4:527).

Winship

reported in these early days, on April 17, that the peasants
were very restless concerning the slowness of the government
to act on the land question (63:861.00/404).

The situation
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grew more tense as the days passed.

By April 21, the gov-

ernment finally had to act, not to help the peasants, but
to inform the troops that they would have to use force
against the peasants who were taking land illegally (4:584).
This land problem continued to plague the infant democracy
until its deatho

The procrastination of the government in

convening the Constitutional Assembly to deal with Russia's
multitude of unique problems stands out as one of the major
errors of the Provisional Government.

The people were hun-

gry for a new life--to have to wait again proved to be too
heavy a load for the people to bear.
May saw a new governmental crisis: public pressure
forced some of the Cabinet Ministers to resign.

Francis

recognized that the government was experiencing grave difficulties as he reported to Lansing different accounts of
disorder from American diplomats in Russia (63:861.00/363).
Unless the government could guarantee that the Russian army
was willing and able to fight,

~rancis

told the Foreign

Minister, then he would recommend that all material support
from America be withdrawn (63:861.00/343).
The internal conditions of Russia in May were bad
at best, and American representatives other than Francis
wired Lansing of the confusion within the country.

Maddin

Summers was especially candid in his lengthy discussion
about the inadequate education of the Russian masses to
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prepare them for a democratic government.

He went on

to explain some of the dangers to which these peasant
Russians were exposed, but concluded they were generally
too ignorant to understand or fear them (63:861.00/406).
North Winship continued his portrait of a society riddled
with anarchy when he related that burglaries and thefts
had increased considerably during May (63:861.00/402).
Reports from Roland Morris in Stockholm and John Ray in
Odessa, said almost the same thing about poor conditions.
Even The Outlook wrote on May 23 that because of her poor
internal conditions, there was the real threat of Russia
making a separate peace with Germany (54:131-32).
Deteriorating and harsh conditions within Russia
did not go unnoticed in the Russian newspapers.

Delo

Naroda claimed the Russian economy was almost a complete
wreck; the paper called for cooperation from all peoples to
stabilize the situation (4:630).
Land reform was an even greater problem in May
than it was in April.

Prince Lvov declared that land

reform would be carried out by the Constitutional Assembly, and told the soldiers at the front not to worry
because land would not be distributed until they were
present.

He explained further that the study was being

conducted to determine the best way to divide the land
(4:527-28).

This governmental directive was met by a
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retort from the peasant paper, Delo Naroda, saying that
the peasants, workers and soldiers were in reality the
governing bodies of Russia (4:534).
As viewed by the United States, the condition of
the Russian army in this general period, April, May and
June, was far below acceptable standardso

Reports were

received by the State Department declaring the Russian
army unfit to carry on the war.

Reporting from Odessa,

John Ray observed that the troops were highly susceptible
to German propaganda, and war weariness made fraternizing
with the enemy much easier (63:861.00/401).

In another

report, he described the lack of discipline in the army;
the troops refused to obey their officers (63:861.00/436).
Winship declared it was obvious to him that the government had no control over the Petrograd troops (63:861.00/

393).

Other American diplomats had comments to make on

the worsening conditions within the army.

Even Francis,

who received much of this same information and was aware
of the problem, insisted that stronger discipline within
the army would improve conditions.
Status and condition of the army continued to be
a problem until the end of the Provisional Government.
The Minister of War told Winship that the situation in
the army was very serious (63:861.00/393); the officers
were failing to keep control of the military machine.
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The Russian newspapers tended to agree on the deplorable
conditions within the army.

Sir George Buchanan explained

that the common soldiers could no longer identify with
the war; fighting for the capitalists was no different
from fighting for the Tsar (5:128).

The Russians could

see little to gain from this war between imperialists.
They would prefer to go home and settle on their share
of land.
Socialist parties in Russia were rapidly gaining
strength in the early months of the Provisional Government.

The main organizational body of the socialists

was the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; but included
in that group was the most radical of all socialists-according to Francis--the Bolsheviks and their leader,
Vladimir I. Lenin.

Francis wrote to his son Perry, tell-

ing him of an "ultra-Socialist" that was inciting people
to violence (18:106).

He admitted in later years that

he predicted Bolshevism would create "worldwide danger"
(18:vi)o

This is not to say, though, that Francis had

pre-judged Lenin or turned a deaf ear to his cries for
reform.

Sir George Buchanan contacted his foreign office

about this same time in May, and said that something had
to be done to prevent Lenin from inciting anarchy and
encouraging the troops to leave the front and come home
to forcefully seize the land if necessary (5:119).
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Fear of a Bolshevik coup was not the only concern
of Americans for internal stability in Russia.

The Work-

men's and Soldiers' Deputies was thought by many to be
the greatest threat to the continuance of the Provisional
Government.

Winship wrote on several occasions to Lansing

expressing his concern about the increasing power and
influence of the Deputies.

The extreme socialists within

the Deputies now had a larger sounding board than they
would have had if they had been united with other socialists.

"Workmen make exorbitant demands," cabled Francis

to the State Department, expressing his concern about
the growing strength and independence of the socialist
Deputies (63:861.00/378).

This division of Russian power

did not go unnoticed by the American public.

George

Kennan wrote several articles in The Outlook describing
his disturbance over the dangers resulting from lack of
central control of the Government.

He was perturbed at

the Provisional Government for playing chess with the
Deputies over social reforms and peace when they should
have been concentrating on winning the war; then peace
would follow (28:217-19).
The governmental crisis in early May aptly displayed the weakness of the Provisional Government.

Foreign

Minister Milyukov sent a declaration of Russian war aims
to the Allied powers with a note of explanation.

The note
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included promises to proceed with the war as originally
intended, and inaccurately reported that the will to
fight had grown stronger among the Russian people.

Th.is

infuriated the people; large crowds gathered immediately
to call for Milyukov's resignation.

The Petrograd Soviet

hastily went into conference with the Cabinet and determined that a new note would be sent to clarify certain
phrases in the note.

The Soviet then ordered all mili-

tary units to abandon the streets unless otherwise ordered
by the Soviet Executive Committee (6:143-45).
The results of the May Crisis were multiple:
first, the Petrograd Soviet displayed its authority over
the soldiers by ordering them off the streets; second,
the Soviet allowed their membership to join the newly
formed and more socialist Cabinet; and lastly, the May
Crisis made it clear to the Allies that the Russians were
dissatisfied with the existing war aims as mentioned in
the secret treaties.
To support the statement that the socialist parties were rapidly gaining strength in Russia are the
results of the Duma elections.

Winship sent the results

to Lansing: bourgeois parties received a total of 167,309
votes; socialists, 389,941; Bolsheviks, 107,760 (63:
861.00/439).
Dumas.

The socialists had dominant control of the

Izvestiia pointed to the fact that the election
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was a large socialist victory, but they cautiously said
that it was also a defeat for extremism on both sides of
the Workmen's and Soldiers• Deputies platform (4:12991300).

This last comment referred to the bourgeois on

one hand, the Bolsheviks on the other.
the voters has to be impressive.

The decision of

Adding all socialist

votes together, they received 497,702 versus the bourgeois' 167,309; or in terms of Duma seats, 477 to 171.
The election resulted in an open expression of choice
for the socialist program.

The bourgeois parties, gene-

rally supported by Francis, were losing ground rapidly
to the reform-minded socialists.
There can be no question that the socialists were
strong in May and June of 1917.

Socialists represented

a large portion of the people and thus it was significant
when they avoided making any comment regarding the United
States entrance to the war, Winship explainedo

He said

that the only statements about the war effort were from
the middle classes, and that even Samuel Gomper•s message
of congratulations on their new government was received
without comment (63:861.00/395).

The American government

officials were not attuned to the socialist mindo

The

socialist language, goals, and means of achieving these
goals were different from those of the Americans.

Germany

posed the only real threat to peace from the American
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point of view, but the Bolsheviks looked upon all capitalist countries as potential threats to peace, including
England and the United Stateso
Conditions in the month of June deteriorated somewhat, and resulted in the creation of a new government
in July.

Roland Morris in Sweden described the Russian

scene as poor and disorganized.

He felt the condition

of the economy and labor was such that Russia was headed
for serious problems (63:861.00/389).

John A. Ray was

not as blunt in his pessimism as was Morris, but he did
point out that the people were concerned about the war
and wanted a peace without annexations, contrary to known
Allied wisheso

According to Ray, the laborers were too

busy playing politics to do their regular jobs.

The people

were becoming restless because of the war and the crop
failures, he asserted (63:861.00/436).

Winship also

described conditions in Russia as generally poor.
Despair and gloom over the Russian scene was not
the only picture painted for the State Department; Francis
and Congress helped build confidence in Russia's strength.
Messages sent to Lansing by Francis were filled with
optimistic phrases such as "Government gaining confidence
and courage," or just simply, "conditions are improving 11
(63:861.00/388).

Congress managed to contribute to Russia's

continued good standing with the American public.

Meyer
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London, United States Representative from New York, managed
a round of applause from fellow House of Representatives
members when he said, "Russia has brought a stream of new
life and liberty, not only for the people of Russia, but
for all mankind" (9:4540).

Other speeches of praise fol-

lowed Representative London's, and although not all agreed,
a number of resolutions were presented describing the confidence that the United States had in the Russian ability
to pull through this trying time.
Through the Provisional Government's own reports,
one could easily see their desperate condition at this
time.

The Minister of Trade and Industry admitted that

the economic conditions were very bad; he stated that the
constant struggles of classes within Russia were causing
turmoil.

Labor was demanding higher wages, he said, thus

endangering the stability of the ruble (4:672-73).

Another

report to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's
and Soldiers' Deputies by the Minister of Food, made it
clear that the government must cooperate with the Deputies.
The Minister asked them to help make the population aware
of the need to sacrifice for the country as a whole (4:636).
Other reports continued to be filed showing the internal
conditions as far less than desirable.

At this point, it

seems strange that with so many people describing poor
conditions in Russia and so few reports in favor of the
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stability of the government, that the State Department,
for the most part, chose to embrace the latter view.

The

wish to accomplish the revered war aims apparently was
more important than seeking an understanding of Russia
in reality.
The month of June brought out more determined
cries for a stronger leader in the Provisional Government.
Prince Lvov proved to be unable to take charge and direct
the government more authoritatively than the Workmen's
and Soldiers' Deputies.

Winship noted the general lack

of authority exhibited by the Provisional Government
(63:861.00/450)0

This obvious lack was even discussed

by the American news media.

The Spectator said the con-

fused times called for a great leader and they mentioned
Army General Brusilov as a potential leader; a man who
could carry Russia on to victory over the Germans and
lead the Russian people to a new world of democracy-American style (55:631)0
When the Provisional Government was first established in March, it was to be a temporary government,
holding power only until a Constitutional Assembly could
be elected and convinced to create a Constitution and a
truly representative government of the Russian peopleo
The Provisional Government had intended to hold elections
September 30, and the Assembly to start on October 13

53

(4:445), but conditions forced another postponement.

The

failure to convene the Constitutional Assembly gave the
Bolsheviks the badly-needed time--and reason--to overthrow the Provisional Government in November.

CHAPTER III
SPECIAL MISSIONS TO RUSSIA
President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State
Robert Lansing viewed Russia as a struggling democracy,
and thought that a special mission to Russia would express
the sincere interest of the United States.

The success

of the actual mission is highly questionable.

Secretary

Lansing was concerned about the increasing socialist propaganda within Russia, and suggested to President Wilson
that a committee be organized to help combat it.

Wilson

agreed (1:16-17).
President Wilson then named Elihu Root to head a
mission to Russia to express the genuine American interest
in and sympathy with the Russian Revolution, and to cooperate with the Russians in conducting the war.

Unfortu-

nately, the purpose of the Root Mission was to try to
keep Russia in the war, not to find out if she wanted to
continue fighting.

There was some question about the

authority of the Root Mission over committees such as
the Railroad Commission in Russia, but Lansing informed
Root that the Missions were separate (22:359).

At the

meeting of the Bourse of Moscow on June 23, 1917, Ambassador Root stated the purpose of the Mission:

"We

intentionally limited the functions of this Mission
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especially to alliance and co-operation in the conduct of
the war against Germany" (72:763.72/6430~).

The Russian

people did not want to hear this; they were interested in
land reform and peace.
The composition of the Root Mission lacked American understanding of the Russian political mood; Wilson's
choice of Elihu Root to head the Mission was a prime example.

Root, a conservative Republican, a former Secretary

of War, Secretary of State, and United States Senator from
New York, never displayed a thorough knowledge of Russia
or the socialist movement.

He was committed to the idea

of defeating Germany, with or without Russia.

Root's

activities while in Russia and his "no fight, no loan''
attitude were unfortunate, for it gave the State Department a false image of the Russian capacity and will to
continue fighting.

The Commission needed a liberal leader

with compassion for a new government and with sympathy
for the Russian people--Root was no such person.

Soon

after his arrival in Russia, Mr. Root wired to Lansing
his impression of the Russian people:
Please say to the President that we have found one hundred and seventy million people and they need to be
supplied with kindergarten material; they are sincere,
kindly, good people but confused and dazed (44:122).
President Wilson had difficulty finding a man of
liberal background to head the Russian Mission; one who
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would also be a good representative of Americao

Wilson's

selection of Root was an effort to display bipartisanshipo
Nevertheless, even a liberal Republican who tried to
understand the European movement would have been a better
selection.

The neglect to include a Russian expert in

the Mission compounded Wilson's unsatisfactory selection
of Root.
President Wilson selected the other members of
the Mission from business, finance, military and humanitarian organizations.

He had difficulty choosing a

socialist for the Mission, because socialism was not
a popular American political philosophy.

His choice of

James H. Duncan, Vice-President of the American Federation of Labor, demonstrated Wilson's misunderstanding of
the radical Russian socialist mind.

American labor was

a bourgeois philosophy by the radical European socialist
standards; the American labor movement, according to the
European socialists, had joined forces with business to
exploit the world's masses, and Duncan personified this
idea.

Another member of the Commission chosen to please

the socialists was Charles Eo Russell, one-time socialist
candidate for President.

Russell was an elderly man, and

was in favor of continuing the war; this kept him from
acceptance by the Russian socialists.

The two military

members of the Mission were General Hugh Scott and
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Admiral Glennon, who understandably embraced the idea of
continuing the war.

s.

American business was represented by

R. Bertron and Cyrus McCormick.

John R. Mott, Executive

Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association, was the
final member of importance; he was to represent the American
feelings of human kindness and religious thinkingo

The Mis-

sion failed to include any important Russian-speaking member,
only an interpreter.

A more compassionate commission of

people might have been able to determine Russia's weakness
and declining will to continue fighting.
Public reaction to the selection of the Root Mission
members was mostly favorable in the United States.

1b&

North American Review considered Root a true representative
of self-government and self-determination.

They said his

Mission was to extend American friendship and lend a helping
hand in the face of the common enemy (38:829-34).

Senator

Miles Poindexter of Washington declared on the Senate floor
that the Mission was charged to bring about cooperation and
coordination of the Allied cause (7:745).

The New York

Times claimed Root to be the best diplomatic brain to combat German diplomacy, and said that his Mission was "one of
the most difficult diplomatic missions which the United
States has ever undertaken in foreign lands" (22:354).

On

May 15, the Times stated bluntly that the purpose of the
Mission was "to save Russia to the Entente cause" (22:354).
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Mr. Ivan Narvodny, Vice-President of the Russian-American
Asiatic Corporation, stated that the socialist element in
Russia would not lead the government because the intellectual middle class would unite with the peasants and establish
a federal republic (37:1401).

By this comment, he approved

the absence of a radical socialist in the Mission.
There was some criticism of Root and his Mission
members, but it was not made public until after the completion of the Mission.

A socialist magazine in New York,

Call, did criticize Root as being the personage of what
the Russians had rejected in Tsarism, and wrote that Root
was an insult to all of Russia's hopes and desires (37:1401);
this was a minority view, however.

On May 20, 1917, the

Mission left for Vladivostok, Russia, on the

Uos.2.

Buffalo.

Once the Mission reached Russia, each member spoke
to groups related to his special interest.

Mr. Root spent

a great deal of his time talking to government officials
and government-related agencies.

He made a strong plea

for the Russian Government to continue the war.

On June 22,

1917, Root addressed the Moscow Duma:
Our faith in your working out a system of free selfgovernment, adapted to the conditions and the character
and the genius of the Russian people, is marred by but
one doubt; and that is the doubt whether you will be
able to protect the right to develop your own free government against the malign and sinister control of
German autocracy (72:763.72/6430t,6).
He also said that the war was a test to see if Russia was
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willing to fight for her freedom.

The speech was met by

loud applause, which was only natural, coming from the Moscow Duma, an organ established by the Tsar and manned by
representatives of the middle class.

Other speeches made by

Root carried basically the same message; that Russia could
not hope to survive without the defeat of German militarism.
He rarely referred to Russia's bright future without first
prefacing it with the need to defeat Germany.
Ambassador Root tried to convince the Russian people of their strong basis for democracy, and he expressed
unlimited confidence in the ability of the Russians to solve
their own problems in the wake of German aggression.

In

order to solidify United States-Russian friendship, Root
said the labor movement in the United States had matured to
the point where labor could look after its own interests and
simultaneously cooperate with the government (72:763.72/

6430t,5).

Organization and enthusiasm were needed by the

Russian workers to make up for the interruption of Allied
supplies, Root explained (72:763.72/6430t,4)o

The differ-

ences between the labor forces of the two countries were
glaring, and to tell a war-weary people that they must
depend on enthusiasm in place of supplies to defeat a
highly mechanized German army bordered on the ludicrous.
Discipline in the army almost disappeared immediately following the Revolution.

Root observed this and
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was appalled; but later, July 13, he said that the army was
under the direction of a great leader, Alexander Kerensky,
then Minister of War (72:763.72/6430!,9).

Root had faith

that new direction and purpose had been achieved in the
army; he made several speeches to soldiers encouraging them
to continue the fight for democracyo

There was cause for

concern, though, in Germany's propaganda barrage against
the Provisional Governmento

Root asked the State Depart-

ment for immediate funds to combat the German propaganda
offensive (22:365); and the Mission itself put up thirty
thousand dollars to start the United States propaganda
machineryo

Lansing agreed to the Mission's advancement,

but not without careful consideration (22:366)0

Thirty

thousand dollars to start a propaganda campaign for the
Allies was a "drop in the bucket," however, considering
what was neededo
Despite the shaky foundation of the Provisional
Government and the obvious unrest and discontent of the
people, Root believed that the Mission had been successful.

He wrote to his wife just before their return trip

that the Mission left the Government and the army much
stronger than before (22:367).
General Hugh Scott inspected the Russian army to
see if they were willing and capable of an offensive
against the Germans.

The report he filed left the final
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conclusion somewhat up in the air; he went to great length
describing the low morale in the Russian army, then concluded they could mount a successful offensive.

He reported

the soldiers had gained control of their local units and
were issuing orders or only obeying those orders with which
they agreed.

Discipline was absent from the army in the

early months of the revolutiono

Scott saw this lack of

discipline spreading to the general populace.

Workers

refused to obey "unjust" orders from factory bosses and
production for the war effort was in serious jeopardy
(72:763072/6430!,1-8).
By the time the revolution was a few months old,
reported Scott, the conditions improved in the army as
well as in society as a whole.

He declared that since

fewer desertions were evident and since many soldiers were
returning to the front lines, confidence in the Russian
will to fight was renewed (72:763.72/6430!,10-12).

Scott

felt the reason for this improvement was due to requests
from the Provisional Government and the Workmen's and
Soldiers' Deputieso

Apparently the fact of a dual govern-

ment in Russia went unnoticed again in the State Departmento
General Scott included in his report a memorandum
by a Colonel Mott describing the Russian military officials
as evasive when asked for statistical information concerning the Russian army's equipment status (72:763072/6430!)0
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Later in his report, General Scott was willing to accept
the word of the Russians that their army had improved
enough to be able to implement an offensive (72:763.72/

6430!,19-20).

Scott did not indicate that he had gone

to the front lines to investigate this himself o
Railroad cars headed the list of military requests
given to General Scott by Russian officers.

The Russian

military was very emphatic that munitions sent by the
United States were of little value unless railroad cars
accompanied the supplies, to ease the overburdened transportation system in Russiao

General Michelson told General

Scott that they were disappointed when the shipment of the
requested five hundred locomotives and ten thousand freight
cars would be postponed until December--they had hoped to
receive them in July.

He went on to say that any military

move would be greatly impaired without improved transportation (72:763.72/6430t,3-4).

The fact remains that every

Russian military department listed railroad cars at the
top of their lists of needed supplies, but the Stevens
Railroad Commission, set up to assist in operating the
Russian railroad system, did not operate functionally
until after the Bolshevik takeover in Novembero
General Scott made it quite clear that it was in
the best interests of the United States to loan Russia
the needed money to continue the war.

He maintained that
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if present conditions continued to exist, Russia would be
forced to drop out of the war; this would be disastrous to
the Allied cause.

A loan of a billion dollars in addition

to the railroad cars requested was Scott's recommendation
to save Russia from a separate peace with Germany (72:
763.72/6430!,26-34).
By General Scott's own admission, he did not spend
any appreciable time on the front lines or talking to the
rank and file soldiers; his time was spent with former
Tsarist officers (72:763.72/6430!,24-25).

However biased

his view of Russia, Scott's attempt to seek a true picture of revolutionary Russia was consistent with most
members of the Mission.
Admiral Glennon reported on the conditions within
the Russian navy.

Like Scott, Glennon reported that the

men refused to obey officers' orders, and in some instances killed a number of unpopular officerso

Workers and

soldiers were working together in controlling all decisions, and the Provisional Government complied with their
demands (72:763072/6430!,1-6).

Again it is evident that

the Russian Government was not monolithic.
Glennon used the workers in a naval repair station
as an example of workers• attitudeso

Workmen did not put

forth a maximum effort, but insisted on having more food
although their wages were already high.

He said that none
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of the workers put in more than four hours of work time
a day, despite the fact they were at work eight hours
(72:763.72/6430i,4-6)o

Glennon seemed concerned with

the general lack of discipline; this was only natural
from a military man.
There was no financial stability within Russia,
according to the report filed by
McCormicko

s.

R. Bertron and Cyrus

They were explicitly candid in their view of

the near-disastrous financial crisis in Russia.

The Pro-

visional Government was losing support from the people
as paper money continued ·to inflate to the point of worthlessness.

Gold deposits did not cover the government's

outstanding debts, and an effort to float a "Liberty
Loan" was less that successful because only a few people
participated.

Bertron and McCormick were concerned that

the people had lost confidence in the Provisional Government.

They said the only true way to rebuild the economy

was for the public to restore its faith in the government
(72:763072/6430~,1-4).

The financial report concluded that the United
States must look carefully at Russia's needs and assist
her in the most crucial areas; Russia's continuance in
the war was dependent on United States' financial aid.
It was agreed that the loan would be safe, because Russia's
assets were more than sufficient to secure repayment after
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the war.

In the meantime, Russia needed a loan immedi-

ately, or Germany might step in with a loan offer (72:

763.72/6430i,5-6).

This idea of German monetary support

of Russian political groups was common among American
officials; from an Allied point of view, any financial
aid to Russia from Germany would be disastrous.
John R. Mott, Executive Secretary of the Young
Men's Christian Association, talked to a variety of Russians, but most of his time was ta.ken up by non-socialists;
this was typical of the entire Root Mission.

His activi-

ties included visiting Russian churches, lecturing for the
need of a Y.MoC.A. in Russia, a speech at the Cossack
Congress and various contacts with the intelligentsia and
educated classeso

He concluded that there was no opposi-

tion in any walk of Russian life to the creation of a
Russian Y.M.CoAo; in fact, most Russians advocated it.
To make this plan become reality, however, the United
States would have to generously finance it, according to
Mott (72:763.72/6430!,3).

Soldiers in the army had too

many hours of leisure in which they sat around thinking
of their plight.

A Y.MoCoA. would give these idle men

an opportunity to become active and improve their morale
and raise their spirits, Mott assured in his report (72:

763.72/6430t,2).

He lectured on several occasions to

popularize his belief in the need of a Russian Y.M.C.A.
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By his own admission, Mott spent considerable
time conferring with church officials.

His feeling was

that if anyone wished to talk to the Russian people, contact must be made through the Orthodox Church, because it
was the "Heart of Russia" (72:763.72/6430!,1).

Evidently

Mott did not anticipate reaching the radical socialists,
as they, with good reason, did not support the former
Tsarist tool, the Orthodox Church.
Charles E. Russell, one-time socialist candidate
for President, spoke to the various socialist parties in
Russia.

He claimed to be a fellow socialist, when in

fact Russian radical socialists looked upon the American
socialists as members of the bourgeois.

In an address to

a socialist group, Russell tried to convince them that
their success and future were solely dependent upon the
survival of democracy (72:763.72/6430!,2).

Nothing could

have been further from the truth as far as the radicals
were concernedo

Russell did not stop there; he continued

trying to convince the Russian people that it was their
duty to fight the Germans; only cowards refuse to fight,
he argued (72:763.72/6430!,2).

Men should not be afraid

to die for liberty, liberty they all loved so much--he
spoke as if the Russians had known liberty all their liveso
Russell tied German victory to Russian defeat; if Germany
was able to defeat the Allies, then surely Russia could
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not hope to survive.

Russian liberty could not be tolerated

in a world dominated by militarism (72:763.72/6430i,1).
Russell made a last appeal to the socialists by
saying the United States, a peace-loving nation, was driven to war to save democracy (72:763.72/6430i,4), and
Russia's new democracy should join with America in the
march for a democratic victory.

Russians should not fear

death, for a loss of this war would result in another kind
of defeat--autocratic rule (72:763.72/6430!,1).

From

Russell's own agenda, he failed to talk enough with all
groups of socialists, nor did he mention ever talking
with the Bolsheviks.

It is difficult to believe that the

Russians could have accepted Russell's suggestion that
only cowards refuse to fight or die for a cause, especially in light of the millions of Russians that had
already died in defense of their country.
The last member of the Root Mission to file a
separate report was James Duncan, Vice-President of the
American Federation of Labor.

He spent the majority of

his time speaking to workers and their unionso

As pre-

viously explained, the Russian workers were making
excessive demands on the factories and the Provisional
Government.

These workers were not accustomed to demand-

ing benefits without the Tsar to refuse or even punish
them.

James Duncan began telling them to work extra shifts
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without compensation, putting forth additional effort to
defeat Germany, because the soldiers were already doing
their extra share (72:763072/6430!,7-9).

This was not

what the Russian workers wanted to hear.
In his report to Root, James Duncan made it clear
that he believed the general conditions within Russia
had greatly improved.

He also mentioned that his attempt

to convince workers to put in extra shifts had brought
Cossack criticism of the Maximalists (Bolsheviks) and
agreement with his policy (72:763.72/6430!,9,12).

Duncan

represented American unions as cooperative with the United
States government's war struggle and hoped to convince
Russian unions to have the same cooperation with their
government.
The Root Mission submitted its final report as
a composite of their activities as individuals of the
Mission and their collective views of the general situation in Russia.

Conditions were confusing at first with

near-anarchy, the Mission reported; but later the government gained more trust of the people and was better able
to govern (72:763.72/6430!,2-3).

The Mission displayed

satisfaction in the Russian character to survive this
most trying test of their drive for freedom.

Transpor-

tation was considered the main problem of the Russian
government in relation to the war burden, reported the
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Committee, and railroad cars were desperately needed
(72:763.72/6430!,10-11).
Root's final report continued by listing their
objectives: the first two were general platitudes of faith
in Russian democracy; the third described the essence of
the Mission:
To promote a realization of the fact that the effective
continuance of the war was the only course by which the
opportunity for Russia to work out the conditions of
her own freedom could be preserved from destruction by
German domination (72:763.72/6430!,24).
Francis held this same belief; in fact the report gave
credit to Francis for supporting the Mission's activities
in Russia, and supporting their conclusions (72:763.72/
6430!,26).

Finally, the Mission summarized that United

States aid was necessary to keep Russia in the war.
Their last comment in reference to the suggestion for
aid was:
That the benefit of keeping Russia in the war and its
army in the field will be so enormous that the risk
involved in rendering the aid required should not be
seriously considered (72:763.72/6430!,26-27).
Public reaction to the Root Mission's report was
understandably enthusiastic.

The report described the

Russians as hard-fighting people longing for peace and
the same style of democracy America cherishedo
it had a limited circulation,

~Nation

Although

did sum up gene-

ral public opinion of Root and his Mission when it wrote
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about Root's opening speech in Petrograd:
o • • that speech will remain one of the masterly
documents of the war. It showed perfect understanding
blended with such sympathy as many more 1tdemocratic 11
personages and organs of public opinion than Mr. Root
have shown themselves incapable of • • • (47:166-67).
Unfortunately, Mro Root did have the sympathy for the
Russian cause, but not the understanding of their peculiar
situation.
President Wilson seemed to disregard completely
any suggestions by the Mission and also neglected to talk
to Root after his returno

The matter of implementing the

Mission's recommendation was passed on to the Creel Committee of Public Information.

Wilson never talked to

Root after that to discuss Russian problems or possible
solutions.

It seems strange that during the later Allied

invasion of Russian Siberia that Root was not consulted
for his thoughts on the subjecto
Hindsight offers the view that the Root Mission
was far from successful.

The members of the Mission were

not logical choices to send to a struggling revolutionary
country; most of them saw in Russia only what they wanted
to see, and conditions were either ignored or misreado
This is easily understood, as few of them bothered to
associate with the radical socialists; only those people
and groups that agreed with them were consulted.

Root's

recommendations fell far short of a comprehensive plan to
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save Russia; films and Y.M.C.Ao games were not going to
win the desperately needed time for the Russians to collect their thoughts and create a cohesive political
philosophyo

The war was a thorn in her side; it had to

be removed for her to survive.

David Francis summed up

the sad American misunderstanding in his usual naive and
candid way when he asserted:

"· o • the Commission repre-

sented all the interests in our own country, and had come
for the purpose of welcoming Russia to the sisterhood of
republics" (18:128).

How unfortunate; the Russians did

not want to hear loudly sung platitudes of democracy
from the warring Allies, they wanted to be left to build
their own dreams.
Successful prosecution of the war by Russia was
of paramount interest to the Allies.

The lack of equip-

ment and coordination of the transportation system have
been mentioned in connection with the Root report, and
as the first few months after the Revolution unfolded,
it became increasingly evident to the Allies that there
was need for their assistance in coordinating Russian
railroads.

The United States made inquiries of the Rus-

sian government as to whether such assistance would be
welcome.

What could they say?

Even David Francis recog-

nized the true problem when he said the Russian railroad
personnel were competent, but the lack of government
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cooperation and equipment reduced their efforts to confusion; he went on to say that the Russians resented outside
advice (71:861.77/48).

Nevertheless, the United States

organized a Railroad Commission, headed by engineer John
Stevens, to advise the Russians on railroad organizational
matters.

Due to illness and equipment delays, the Commis-

sion did not begin to operate fully in Russia until the
Provisional Government had fallen under Bolshevik pressure.
Not surprisingly, the Railroad Commission had little effect
on the Provisional Government.

The United States would have

been in a better position by sending the needed railroad
equipment requested than to send advisors to Russia.

Advice

they had; equipment they lacked.
President Wilson felt that it was necessary to make
the thoughts and feelings of the United States known to the
Russian infant democracy.

He assigned George Creel's Com-

mittee on Public Information to this task; in turn, Creel
selected Edgar Sisson to head the actual delegation to
Russia.

Sisson explained his purpose as helping to imple-

ment the "practicable portion" of the Root report, explain
the American purpose and struggle in the war and to weaken
German morale whenever possible (51:3).

Sisson 1 s group

sailed October 27 and arrived in Russia November 25-eighteen days after the demise of the Provisional Government.
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Although the Information Committee arrived after
the Bolshevik takeover, Sisson still provided another view
of the problems discussed earlier.
Francis was mixedo

His opinion of David

Francis' hatred of the Bolsheviks was

obvious, according to Sisson (51:29), and his general lack
of confidence in Francis' ability and objectiveness was
supported by otherso

He suggested that Ambassadors should

be removed and replaced by better qualified coordinators
of war-time policy in time of war (51:30).
Sisson considered the Root report recommendations
to be vague and somewhat "unpractical."

The implementa-

tion of a mass propaganda campaign in Russia could not be
started immediately, nor could it have guaranteed success.
The dollar cost of such a program would be high; Sisson
favored a close watch on money expenditures (51:5).
Sisson's Committee arrived in Russia too late to be of
any help, but he does bring to light a few crucial issues
that concern this paper.
There was one last Mission to Russia: the Red
Cross.

The Red Cross was controversial not because of

its intended purpose, but because of the individuals
involved as the leaders of this supposedly charitable
organizationo

Two men in the Red Cross were noteworthy;

one for his complete disregard for presidential and political channels, and the other for his direct involvement
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in Russian Government activities after the Bolshevik takeover.

William Boyce Thompson, a Chicago millionaire, was

appointed to lead the Red Cross group in Russia, although
his qualifications for such a job were questionableo

The

other controversial member was Raymond Robins, a full time
social reformer who was known to have been in contact with
Russian revolutionaries prior to his Red Cross appointmento
The purpose of the Red Cross in Russia was to help
the people regardless of their political affiliations and
to impress upon them that the United States wanted to help
(14:272).

By the time Thompson re-interpreted the purpose

of the Red Cross, it was indistinguishable from the original.

Thompson admitted he would do all in his power to

keep the Russian forces intact (19:184), and he put it
bluntly in memorandum form:
The problems which it was apparent to me must be
met in Russia were three in number:
1. How to assist Russia and keep her actively
fighting in the Entente Alliance.
2. Failing in No. 1, how to prevent Russia from
making a separate peace.
3. Failing in Nos. 1 and 2, how to prevent Russia
from being used by Germany against the Allies (19:201).
These objectives do not sound like objectives of a charitable organizationo

Thompson worked hard to help the

Allied cause; he was a frustrated man who used charity
work to vindicate his long life of merciless money making.
Even while living in Russia, Thompson surrounded himself
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with luxuries and associated mainly with top government
officials, something he was accustomed to in the United
States.
Raymond Robins was more astute in revolutionary
ideas and methods than Thompson, and he used his ability
to push hard the American message to the Russian people.
He, more than anyone, talked to all sides of the Russian
society; Robins would exchange ideas with any man, no
matter how radical.

He traveled throughout Russia lec-

turing to soldiers and to anyone who would listen about
America's purpose in entering the war.

Reality finally

dawned on Robins, as he admitted in late October, "The
war is dead in the heart of the Russian soldier" (20:46).
After the Bolshevik counter-revolution in November, to
the dismay of many Americans, Robins continued on in
Russia talking frequently with Bolshevik leaders.
Education of the Russian mind to combat the German
propaganda offensive was Thompson's major objective.

He

was excited by Catherine Breshkovsky 1 s committee to inform
the public of their duties to a people's government.

His

devotion to his new found role was so zealous that he contributed one million dollars of his own money toward the
propaganda fund in Russiao

With this money he started

newspapers, lectures and various organizations to pass
the word that the success of the revolution was contingent
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on Germany's defeato

Thompson realized, however, that one

million dollars was not enough, so he cabled Washington
explaining his program and requesting one million dollars
immediately and three million a month thereafter.

Three

weeks elapsed before a weak message arrived from Washington
saying that the matter was under considerationo

The mes-

sage also advised that a member of the Committee on Public
Information, Edgar Sisson, would soon arrive in Petrograd
to administer American propaganda (20:38-39).

Thompson con-

tinued to press for the urgently needed funds as he wrote
to Henry P. Davison, Chairman of the American Red Cross, to
pressure Wilson into some form of action on Washington's
part until the matter received further study.

Davison urged

Thompson not to commit himself to further involvement without government approval (19:219).

Thompson persisted,

however, but Wilson ably avoided his proddingo
Sisson's Propaganda Committee left for Russia with
approximately one-eightieth of Thompson's request and a
message from Wilson lauding him for good work and hinting
that he avoid any further involvement (19:231).

Wilson's

neglect of Thompson's ideas seems consistent with his avoidance of most other matters concerning Russian internal
affairs.

Germany's defeat and the enactment of Wilson's

Fourteen Point program were first priority.
Henry P. Davison wrote in later years that the Red
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Cross had done a good job in light of the difficult circumstances.

He listed the supplies sent to Russia, such as

ambulances and medical supplies, milk and a limited amount
of funds for relief work (14:269).

Davison was naive in

his assumption of Red Cross accomplishments; the small
dent they made in the Russian problem was almost unnoticed
by the Russians, and, for that matter, not necessarily welcomed.

Thompson and Robins were busy involving themselves

in Russian politics and did not perform customary Red Cross
work.

Thompson's concern was with Russian mobilization

against the advancing Germans in order to save the revolution, not in the commonplace distribution of medical
supplies.

This is not to say they were unsuccessful, but

they surely did not accomplish for the Red Cross what Mr.
Davison would have had the public believe.
American attempts through the various special missions to influence Russia to resist German aggression were
doomed to failure.

All of these missions had preconceived

ideas of the Russian situation and how to cope with it;
none had any understanding of the people's desire for their
own chance to govern themselves in peace.
The Red Cross Commission did not perform its intended duties and the only reason it is mentioned is because
of its participants, Thompson and Robins.

Edgar Sisson's

Propaganda Committee was doomed to failure from the outset
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because the Bolsheviks had attained control by the time
Sisson arrived.

The Stevens Railroad Commission suffered

the same fate: inactivity until the Bolsheviks took over.
Even though the Mission was set up in time, the first months
were spent in talking--time the Bolsheviks used for positive
activity.

Lastly, the Root Mission failed because its mem-

bers, for the most part, were not attuned to the needs of
the peopleo

Russell and Duncan were the only members who

talked with all parties in Russia, and then only on a
limited scale.

The Mission had sailed from Seattle with

pre-conceived notions as to Russia's problems and their own
views of remedies for these problems; they returned without
adequate solutions.

One should keep in mind, though, that

all of these Missions, the men involved and conclusions
reached, were representative of general American thought.
Only a small minority of viewers could see the true picture
of Russia--and they were generally ignored.
George F. Kennan, writing in Soviet-American Relations, agreed that the Missions had little "appreciable
favorable effect on the course of events in Russia."
fact, he suggested that some of the Missions were not
wanted by the Russians, but only tolerated in order to
receive materials from the United States (29:21).

In

CHAPTEH IV
DIPLOlVIACY:

JULY THROUGH OCTOBER

July to November of 1917 was a time of utter confusion; crisis after crisis arose, yet the Provisional
Government managed to weather each one, losing some control
each time.

By November the situation was such that the much

discredited and weakened government could not bear the pressure and had to succumb to the Bolsheviks.

Hindsight shows

an America committed to the war encouraged a weakening
Provisional Government to go on fighting.

Even after the

fall of the government, the American public failed to
understand what had happened and why.

This chapter will

deal with the major events of this five month period, with
special emphasis on the Bolsheviks.
Alexander Kerensky was without question the most
important man in the Provisional Government.

To discuss

him and all the controversy involved with him would be
voluminous, to say the least; however, it is not the intent
of this paper to present a biographical sketch of Alexander
Kerensky.
David Francis had great difficulty establishing an
attitude toward Kerensky.

He wanted a dictatorial leader

of the government, but also one who could see the problem
of Russia from Francis' viewpoint.

Kerensky was indeed the
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strongest member of the government, but not nearly strong
enough to cope with decisions that required firmness or
farsightedness.

Francis put his trust in Kerensky, but was

critical of his weakness in dealing with the Bolsheviks and
the General Kornilov Affair, which was an apparent attempt
to overthrow the Provisional Government.

In later years,

Francis was critical of Kerensky's failure to deal firmly
with Lenin and Trotsky (18:193-94).
July was a disruptive month in Russia.

The govern-

ment was shaky and eventually fell, only to be replaced by
another coalition governmento

Francis began to report the

general disruption and unrest of the people on the first
day of July.

He observed that parades were being organized

with banners flying calling for "Bread, Peace, Freedom,"
well-known Bolshevik demands.

The only government support-

ers Francis mentioned were the Cossacks (63:861.00/419).
The next week the local Dumas held elections with results
that could have meant a gradual change in the attitude of
the people toward their own government and the war.

Maddin

Summers, Consul in Moscow, reported that the local election
witnessed victory for the various socialist parties.

He

was careful to point out that the election showed no direct
opposition to the war, although more than ten per cent of
the votes were cast for the Social Maximalists (Bolsheviks).
The Socialist Revolutionaries won the majority of the votes;
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they were a peasant party with less radical demands than
some fellow socialist parties (63:861.00/466).

North

Winship reported basically the same results in the Petrograd election for Duma representatives.

The socialists

completely dominated the election with the Socialist Revolutionaries gaining the majority of seats, but only by a
slim margin.

The Bolsheviks received 37 seats out of 200

(the Socialist Revolutionaries received 54), but combined
with the less radical half of their party, the Social
Democrat Mensheviks, they held 77 seats, by far the largest
voting block (63:861.00/463).

If nothing else, the elec-

tions indicated a turn toward the socialist view and closer,
if only slightly, to the position of questioning the war.
Francis failed to see this trend.
On July 17, 1917, demonstrations against the government intensified.

Francis reported that a large gathering

at the Duma called for Kerensky's arrest.

Many Ministers

resigned because of the disturbance, and Prince Lvov, President of the government, drew up plans to implement demands
of the peasantso

It was even suggested that the Workmen and

Soldiers take command of the government (63:861.00/427).
Roland Morris cabled Lansing concerning the disruptive conditions in Petrograd, declaring that some soldiers had shot
their officers and uncontrolled rioting was present (63:
861.00/422).
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Francis reported on July 20, 1917, that Prince Lv.ov
resigned as President of the Russian government, and suggested that Kerensky be his successor because he was the
only man who could execute the government plans.

Lvov was

very pleased with his governmental term, mainly because it
had prevented the advance of the Bolsheviks, Lenin had been
arrested, and the army was taking its orders from the Ministry, which suggested stability (63:861.00/430).

Lvov also

announced, through Francis, that the Bolshevik faction had
been eliminated--apparently he neglected to look closely at
the recent Duma electionso
Kerensky returned from the front as Prince Lvov
resigned, and immediately offered his resignation, but, as
Francis concluded, was wisely refused.

Francis was con-

cerned that Kerensky's resignation amidst the new active
militancy of the workers would be fatal to the government's
survival (63:861.00/424).

It is interesting to compare at

this same time Winship's impressions of Russia's needs with
this conclusion of

~"rancis'.

Winship felt that a new and

strong coalition government was not enough; there had to
be a more cohesive attitude among the classes of Russian
society.

He said:

As long as war lasts this disintegration will continue
to progress geometrically. But a real burst of genuine
patriotism, which means unity and co-operation between
classes, could slow down the process and perhaps keep
Russia on her feet until the end of the war (63:861.00/
478).
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Winship continued to be critical and somewhat sarcastic of
the Provisional Government's ability to control the people,
and asserted that only the Workmen's and Soldier's Deputies
were able to exercise any degree of authority over the
troops (63:861.00/450).
The appointment of a new Ministry by Kerensky was
a good sign, according to Francis, but he admitted that food
riots had to be curbed if the Ministry hoped to be effective.
He went on to explain that criticism of the Workmen and Soldiers by competent men indicated "improved public sentiment"
(63:861.00/461).
The contrast between Winship's and Francis' analysis
of the situation was glaring.

Winship refused to believe

that one man could change the complexion of a people's attitude and psychological makeup, whereas Francis wanted to see
stability in the new government and weakness in the Workmen's
and Soldiers' Deputies.

Winship witnessed the increasing

power of the Deputies, but Francis only reported the hopeful
demise of their influence in Russia.

Failure to recognize

changing public sentiment and increasing influence of the
Deputies continued to be Francis' greatest faulto
Kerensky's new government was met with mixed emotions by his fellow Russians.

The moderate socialists were

enthusiastic about his chances for successful use of the
country's resources; the claim that the government was
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non-partisan was not uncommon.

The Rabochaia Gazeta wrote

that the government would "save the country .from military
devastation" (4:1432).

12.tlQ. Naroda claimed Kerensky was

just the political genius needed to stabilize the government (4:1434).

Support o.f the government was guaranteed

by Izvestiia; it .felt the government represented the essential parts o.f Russian politics (4:1435).
Opposition to Kerensky's government was not absent.
The conservative parties were opposed to the predominately
socialist government.

Novoe Vremia criticized the inclusion

o.f radical socialists in the Ministry; those whose loyalty
was questionable (4:1430).

The more radical socialists

opposed the government because it .failed to disassociate
.from inadequate programs and did not pass social legislation rapidlyo

Novaia Zhizn supported this view (4:1436).

A few papers took a more cautious "wait and see" attitude
toward the new Ministryo

It is apparent that Kerensky did

not have unquestioned support from the inception o.f his
government.

He did have the backing o.f the major parties

currently in public favor; he eventually lost this support.
American diplomats disagreed on the meaning of
Russian internal conditions in July.

The biggest news of

the month was the unsuccessful uprising of the Bolshevikso
As far as the general conditions go, most American observers
were concerned about Russia's stability and desire to
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continue the war.

Railroad conditions were reported by

D. Bo Maggowan, Vice Consul at Moscow, to be very bad.
Relations between railroad workers and management had
deteriorated to a point where the workers refused to
obey management orders and demanded control for themselves (71:861.77/145)0
Messages arrived at the State Department describing
apathy in the people and a lack of enthusiasm for continuance of the war.

This feeling of apathy was coupled with

a growing push by some socialists for a separate peace with
Germany.

Winship reported on several occasions that the

socialists viewed the war and victory differently from the
Allies or the Russian Government.

"Peace without annexa-

tions" was the socialist demand; they believed the improved
Russian army now could command consideration for acceptance
of this proposal (63:861.00/455).
As before, David Francis refused to state that conditions were taking a turn for the worseo

On those few

occasions that Mr. Francis did relay declining conditions,
he generally concluded his message with words of encouragement about the newest improved conditionso

In July, as in

past months, he supported the Russian government's stand.
Conditions were improving, he said on July 23; workers fully
recognized the government and a stricter discipline had been
restored in the army (63:861.00/432).
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Again the pattern was the same:

Francis conveying

hope, promise and false conditions, and other observers
seeing doubt and reason to believe in eventual Russian
defeat unless something was done to change the situation.
Francis' version of the story was accepted by the Wilson
Administration because it encouraged Wilson in his hope
for an Allied peace.
Bolshevik activity was the main topic of discussion
in dispatches to Washington during the month of July.

The

Bolsheviks attempted a coup on July 16, 17 and 18, when
their activity was forced by the restless workers and soldiers.

This aggressive unrest was evident in factory

demands and soldier unwillingness to fight.

The socialists

were becoming more influential, but even the Bolsheviks were
finding it difficult to restrain the over-zealous people.
Alexander Kerensky was aware of this unrest among
the people and as Minister of War he decided a major offensive on the Russian-German front would divert the attention
of the people and give Russia the international prestige
needed to continue the war (6:164-65)0

The offensive started

well because the Russians faced only the weak Austrian soldiers, but when German re-enforcement arrived, the Russians
panicked; soldiers threw down their rifles and fled.
The offensive was a failure from the military view,
and it compounded unrest among the masses.

Discontent with
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the revolution grew to a point of becoming uncontrollable
in the citieso

The Bolsheviks did not want to attempt a

coup in July; they were forced into it from fear that the
Bolsheviks would lose control of the radical element (6:166).
The July Crisis was poorly organized and eventually
failed, but not without causing the exposure of the weakness of the Provisional Government.

Publications of German

documents by Gregory Alexinsky and Vasily Pankrativ, men
of questionable character and intent, helped control the
crisis.

They alleged that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were

German agents.

William Chamberlin suggested in The Russian

Revolution 1917-21, that Kerensky encouraged the publication
of the documents in order to destroy Bolshevik power (6:181).
The allegations in the documents were damaging to the Bolsheviks; many were forced into hiding while others were
being arrested.
The results of the Kerensky offensive and the July
Crisis were of a conservative nature.

Top Bolshevik leaders

were in jail or in hiding; unruly army regiments were broken
up; some arms searches were conducted; the death penalty was
restored on July 25; additional restrictions were imposed on
the press; and a new Cabinet was formed on August 6, made up
of right-wing socialists and non-socialists, with Alexander
Kerensky named Prime Minister on July 21 (6:184-89).
Francis reported that the Bolshevik uprising caught

88
the government by surprise.

Hundreds were reportedly killed

as the Cossacks resisted the Bolsheviks (63:861.00/428).
A strong government would have been prepared to stop such
a limited attempt at a coup, but Kerensky assured Francis
that many Bolsheviks had been captured and would be severely
punished.

Francis observed that some people hoped Kerensky

would assume dictatorial powers, but Francis doubted this
would happen (63:861.00/440).
Defeat of the Bolsheviks was not just a fancy of
Mr. Francis; others, including Russian government officials, hoped for the same thing.

Bolshevism was at an end,

according to a government official, echoed Roland Morris
from Sweden; the government had failed to capture Lenin,
but they did believe they had put a stop to the Bolshevik
movement (63:861.00/431).
A detailed explanation of the July Bolshevik riots
was sent to Lansing from Winship in Petrogrado

He did not

give glowing platitudes about government stability and
strength in the face of an internal enemy, instead he
described a weakened government feebly resisting a threat
to its very existence.

The riots not only caused death,

they also caused havoc in the army and with the economyo
Confidence in the government's strength was challenged
and slackened to a point where the Liberty Loan was in
jeopardyo

Government support from the troops and police
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was questionable during the disorders and would continue
to be.

It is interesting to note, as Winship indicated,

that even though many moderate socialists refused to support and even opposed the Bolshevik riots, they defended
them against accusations of being pro-German.

Winship

also concluded that each attempt at Bolshevik pressure on
the government had grown more intense and the Bolsheviks
were far from dead after this last setback (63:861.00/477).
A less objective, though more positive stand on
the July disorder was put forth by Sir George Buchanan.
He was aware, and stated frequently, that the Provisional
Government was too weak and indecisive when trying to stop
radical groups from disrupting government activities.

On

July 23, Buchanan wired the British Foreign Office that the
Russians had missed an unparalleled opportunity to stop the
Bolsheviks permanently.

He said the occupation of the

Pravda offices and imprisonment of key Bolshevik personnel
was good, but then they returned the captured Pravda documents and released the prisoners.

"The Prime Minister was

not strong enough to take advantage of this unique opportunity of suppressing anarchy once and for all" (5:165).
Official Russian government reaction to the Bolshevik uprising was to stop the publication of Pravda and
any other publication that advocated disobedience in the
military (4:979).

Any type of censorship is dangerous and
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censorship of government opposition is especially hazardouso

When people are refused legal public means by

which to express their views, then illegal and usually
more radical methods are used to inflame the public mind
toward a particular cause.

Government restoration of

the death penalty for desertion from the army testified
to the infiltration of the Bolshevik propaganda calling
for soldiers to refuse to fight.
Socialist parties expressed concern that the Bolsheviks had weakened the government's ability to maintain
relative calm.

Rabochaia Gazeta expressed this view by

observing that the July riots opened up the opportunity
for counterrevolutions.

Once the Bolsheviks gained power,

then near anarchy would reign because no one would be
able to stop further revolutions (4:1362-63)0
Aid from the United States to the Provisional Government was extremely important in the relations between
the two governments, because it displayed the American
attitude toward the entire Russian situation.

In the

early part of July, when Russia requested an additional
loan from the United States, Secretary of the Treasury
William McAdoo was hesitant to approve such a loan without knowledge of the internal conditions of Russia.

He

asked Lansing to have Mr. Root or Ambassador Francis
inform him of the conditions (69:861.51/159).

The situation
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was such that a loan was urgently needed to secure Russia's
continuance in the war, cabled Root.

It was recommended

that a loan of seventy-five million dollars be made available to the Russian government with no restriction as to
how or where the money was to be spent (69:861.51/154).
McAdoo responded immediately with an additional seventyfive million dollar credit loan to Russia (69:861.51/156).
A much tougher stand was taken by Ambassador
Francis, as he was opposed to loans to a weak Russian Government unwilling or unable to continue prosecution of the
waro

Francis was of the opinion that American loans should

be used to push for a stronger Provisional Government and
force an increased war effort.

On July 18, Francis bluntly

stated that no loans should be extended unless the present
Russian government, or a stronger replacement, could maintain order and prosecute the war (69:861.51/167).
This hesitation to assist the Russian government by
the Treasury Department and the suggested conditional support from Ambassador Francis depicts official American
attitude toward Russia.

If Russia could have maintained

order and exercised a more vigorous war effort, then the
United States would have extended all necessary money and
materials.

There appeared to be no real desire to help the

Russian people themselves.

Even Francis' request for propa-

ganda films to instruct the newly created yet ignorant
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Russian voter how to vote intelligently (meaning against
the socialist parties) is evidence of American feelings
toward their "fellow democracy" (67:861.4061/12a).
Doubt about Russia's stability continued to be
the major question when dealing with loanso

Francis went

on questioning the Russian government's ability to continue
the war before approving loans to them.

Finally, on August

28, Francis told Lansing that the physical wealth of Russia
was enough to secure any loan the United States might make
available (70:861051/199).

By the time a loan of any sig-

nificant size could be approved and implemented, however,
the arrival of any purchased materials would be November at
the earliest.

This would be too late.

During this exchange of notes between various American officials concerning a loan to Russia, a question about
the Russian Ambassador to Washington, Boris Bakhmeteff,
arose.

The Treasury Department was worried that he might

not have full authority to negotiate for the loan.

The

State Department requested that Francis clear up this matter.

Francis complied in the affirmative, because by now

he was convinced that any loan to Russia was worth the risk,
as the loss of Russia would be too costly to the Allies
(66:861.24/16).
Ironically, Francis was now in favor of loans to
Russia, but the Treasury Department became increasingly
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more suspicious of Russia's ability to wage waro

Acting

Secretary of the Treasury Oscar To Crosby insisted that no
further credits from the original seventy-five million dollar loan would be allowed unless Francis could convincingly
show that the money would not be lost (70:861.51/223).
Francis continued to press for the loans.
Securing the loan was difficult enough, but
receiving the supplies ordered was even harder.

Russia

had ordered a large number of rifles and ammunition from
the United States to be manufactured primarily by the Colt
Company.

The shipment of these supplies was delayed because

of the poor transportation in Russia, and doubt as to their
arrival was expressed by Lansing (66:861.24/15).

The final

blow came when Secretary of War Newton D. Baker told Boris
Bakhmeteff, Russia's Ambassador, that their order of Vickers
guns had been cancelled and this word had been passed on to
the Colt Company.

Baker explained that the Vickers gun was

badly needed on the Western front by the French army, and
in addition was needed by the United States aircraft because
it was the only gun that was synchronized with the aircraft
propellers (66:861024/16).

Despite the disappointment Bakh-

meteff must have felt upon hearing this news, the lateness
of the hour, October 29, 1917, meant time was running short,
anyway, for this chapter of Russian democracy.
Russian reaction to the economic scene was, for the
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most part, restricted to the issuance of the Liberty Loan
within Russia.

A very emphatic call for purchase of the

loans was made by Izvestiia.

It claimed the Soviet of

Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies called on the people to
buy Liberty Loans (4:490)0

The people did not react well

to the plea for participation in the program.

Den was con-

cerned, saying that neither the peasants nor the workers
were buying loans.

They called for a propaganda program

to stir up support for the loans (4:491).
The United States extended a total of 375 million
dollars in credits to the Russian Provisional Government.
Due to the internal conditions, this amount of money was
not adequate to meet Russian needs, but from the Treasury's
point of view, it was probably too much.
United States confidence in the Provisional Government varied with each interest group.

The Missions each

expressed hope and confidence in the Russians, Francis
wavered on his support depending on the crisis, and the
State Department seemed to.have less trust in the Russians
as the months passed.

The United States was willing to

express reassurance in the Russian government, but less
and less material support accompanied this feeling about
their ability to surviveo
This apparent lack of American belief in the real
ability of Russia to continue the war in the remaining few
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months was not one-sided.

The Petrograd press printed

several articles criticizing the war and blaming it on all
capitalists, not just Germany (63:861000/510)0

More to the

point was the accusation by the Russian press that the
United States had aided her Western Allies more than Russia
(63:861.00/476).

This added to the already existing agi-

tation in Russia.
By August, rumblings of real unrest were heard.

The

war was not going well and the people were tired; tired of
war, tired of government promises for land reforms and tired
of their new responsibilities.

Interest of the general pub-

lic in the politics of their government was declining and
interest in strictly the economics of life was rapidly
increasing, according to John Ray, Consul at Odessa (63:
861.00/539).

Maddin Summers reported that the Transporta-

tion Minister predicted terrible things for Russia unless
she quickly improved internal conditions (71:861077/196).
President Wilson was also concerned about the mental
state of the Russian Ministry and masseso

He conveyed once

again a message to the Russians reiterating Allied war aims
(10:5722-23).

Wilson did not take into account that the

Bolsheviks did not differentiate between the Allies and the
Germans; the war was one between capitalists.

The fight

must be for liberty and dignity of freedom, Wilson expounded,
without imposing indemnities, and ultimately form a common
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bond to guarantee peace in the future.

He continued:

For these are the things we have always professed to
desire, and unless we pour out blood and treasure now
and succeed we may never be able to unite or show con~uering force again in the great cause of human liberty

l10:5722-23).

The Bolsheviks did not agree with this view--the war was
only for gain of one side over the othero
Reports continued to describe the internal conditions of Russia as crumbling.

In the month of September,

Roland Morris was especially active in painting a gloomy
picture of Russia.

Conditions were bad; food was scarce,

radical propaganda was more intense and the army had more
rumblings of disloyalty.

Army personnel were becoming more

political, Morris commented, as they refused to obey any
order unless it was first approved by the Executive Committee of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council (63:861.00/502).
A good indication of the erosion of confidence in Russian
stability was when both Britain and Japan recalled most of
their citizens from Petrograd.

The British wanted all

women and children to evacuate Petrograd (63:861.00/528).
As September came to a close, Morris' dispatches grew less
promising.

He continued to write of disrespect in the army

and that a form of anarchy hung over Russia because no central authority currently existed that could command enough
respect to gain obedience.
Rumors continued to circulate that the Allies were
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withdrawing from Petrograd, abandoning the Russians to their
own chaotic conditions.

The Germans and anti-Allied social-

ists in Russia were more than willing to spread such rumors
in their travels.

At this same time in September there was

a change in the State Department's attitude toward Russia.
Less confidence was felt in the Russian capability to conduct the war to an end, and even less faith remained in
Kerensky as a leader.

Unfortunately, this changing attitude

did not result in an increased desire to help Russia, only
in a feeling that Russia would not remain in the war; therefore, the attitude developed--"why bet on a losing team?"
Francis alone continued to search for order among the chaos
despite his occasional criticism of the Russianso
In September, despite Francis' doubts about government stability, he.mingled his reports of despair with ones
of faith in Kerensky and the government.

Confusion was the

rule in Russia during this time, and David Francis adapted
quite well to this state of affairs.

His main concern the

entire time was with Russia's weakness, and the knowledge
that her loss to the Allied side would cost the United States
millions of dollars and lives because of an intensified war
on the Western front.

In light of this view, one could

understand why Francis was interested in Russian government
stabilityo

The lack of food grew more critical, reported

Francis, and the greatest menace to Russia was the Bolshevik
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party (18:164-65).

He was in doubt about who the army

would follow in time of crisis; with army loyalty split
between the government, the Deputies, Conservatives and
Bolsheviks, some officials felt civil war was possible
(63:861000/523).
One September communique from Francis stated that
he had talked separately to the Japanese Ambassador to
Russia and various government officials about a contest
between the government and the Soviet.

Each one believed

the Soviet would be victorious, although Francis felt the
government would command the loyalty of the army.

His

confidence was rewarded by agreement from the Russian Foreign Minister (63:861000/527).

Another Ministry was formed

in September by Kerensky, reported Francis, and it was growing stronger because it did not include any Soviets (63:
861.00/519)0

Here again is evidence that Francis was not

cognizant of the reality of Russian politics.

Socialists

were increasingly present in the Ministry after July, even
though they were not the most liberal socialists.

The

Soviets were the most powerful organization in Russia and
hoping to exclude them from the Ministry and then claim to
have a stronger government displayed Francis' complete lack
of comprehension of politics in general, and especially
Russian politics.
The United States never ceased to try to persuade
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Russia to continue to fight.

Messages were sent to poli-

tical and social organizations; Samuel Gompers, for example,
continued to write to the Russians calling for the workers
to limit their demands in favor of a united war effort.
Colonel House emphasized that money must be spent on some
form of educational propaganda to combat the German propaganda; he drew his conclusion from listening to eyewitnesses
from Russia (50:140).

House expressed a real understanding

of the events when he concluded that Russia was about to go
under and wrote, "It is more important, I think, that Russia
should weld herself into a virile republic than it is that
Germany should be beaten to her knees (50:153).

Few others

felt the same as Colonel House did in 1917.
One additional problem had to do with propaganda
and presenting a good American image: United States treatment of socialists within their own country.

There were a

few trials in which socialists were involved and they drew
much attention in Russia.

Francis attended one gathering

in September to hear protests against the United States.
About eight thousand were at the meeting, and were to hear,
according to a handbill, "how this (free) country deals
with its revolutionists" (18:165-66).

Radical socialists

continued to question America's support of the Russian
people versus the American desire to keep Russia in the
war.
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During August the Provisional Government called the
various parties to meet in Moscow to confer on a number of
problems and discuss the proposed Constitutional Assemblyo
Opinion varied as to the success of the Moscow Conferenceo
One group expressed the belief that the government had
emerged from the Conference with more strength and solid
support than ever before.

Izvestiia agreed that the Con-

ference served the government's interests; in their view
it had to, because Russia could be saved only if all the
parties consolidated their goals and worked together for
survival of the revolution (4:1520).

Contrary to this

view was the theory that the Conference caused Russia to
split into two political groups.

No one emerged a victor,

everyone suffered a small defeat, wrote Den (4:1518).
Again, the newspapers split their opinions along political
lines; the radicals on either end could see no favorable
outcome in Moscow, whereas moderate socialists wanted to
see hope, and they did.
Elections to the Constituent Assembly, already postponed from its original dates, was set for November 12, and
the Assembly itself would convene on November 28, 1917.
The failure to hold the Assembly earlier, as originally
planned, probably sent the Provisional Government to an
earlier death than would otherwise have been the case.
Land reform was needed before the Tsar fell, and.postponing
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it for a long time after his downfall was more than most
ignorant peasants could understando

The Assembly was to

alleviate the inequities and distribute the land among
the peasants; delaying land reform was a major error of
the Provisional Government.
The last major crisis Kerensky faced before the
Bolsheviks took over was the Kornilov Affair.

Named for

General Kornilov, it was particularly important because
it not only displayed Kerensky's weakness and the weakness
of the government, but it also allowed the Bolsheviks to
gain their final foothold before stepping into power.
General Kornilov was named Commander-in-Chief of
all the Russian forces.

Francis described him as a man

of small stature, but an iron constitution coupled with
a will of steel.

He could speak seventeen languages,

which made him popular among the multitudinous nationalities in the Russian army.

Strict adherence to mili-

tary rules was enforced by Kornilov.

Francis used the

example of one hundred deserters that had been shot and
placed on the roadway with placards reading, "I was shot
because I ran away from the enemy and was a traitor to
Russia" (18:145).

If Francis had the power, he could

not have molded a man more suited to his ideal.
Morale improved and discipline was restored to
the army with the appointment of Kornilov as Commander
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of the Army.

Kornilov believed in a strong government as

well as a disciplined army.

Kerensky's vacillating actions

concerning the radical socialists, his failure to restore
order in the army and with the Workmen's and Soldiers'
Deputies all were an anathema to Kornilov.

Rumors that

forces were at work in Russia to restore the monarchy added
tension to the differences between the two men.

A major

German victory at the front generated Bolshevik activity
in Petrograd, and caused Kornilov to move his forces to
the outskirts of the city.

Much confusion followed.

Kornilov sent Vladimir Lvov to Kerensky to demand
the latter's resignation and place himself as a temporary
military dictator.

Of course, Kerensky refused and tried

to find a replacement for Kornilov as Commander of the
Army.

Kerensky could find no one willing to take command

immediately, and meantime the threat of Kornilov and his
forces marching on the city was greatly increasede

At

this point, Kerensky made his fatal error; he armed the
Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, including the Bolsheviks, to resist Kornilov, which they did successfully
(63:861.00/501)e

Kerensky was caught in the middle of

two forces with opposing political views, and he willingly armed one to defeat the other.
Following Kornilov's defeat on September 12,
Francis cabled Lansing that the government was stronger
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as a result, but if discipline in the army was not restored
immediately, Russia would be out of the war (63:861.00/515).
Kerensky formed a new Ministry and invited the Cadets to
join; however, the Soviets refused to allow their members
to join if the Cadets did (63:861000/516).
Reports came into the State Department that the
Kornilov Affair had badly shaken the government.

The radi-

cals on both ends had gained a larger voice because the
moderates were busy destroying themselves.

Maddin Summers

claimed that Kerensky was having difficulty forming a new
cabinet, and criticism was increasing because many people
thought that Kornilov had been tricked by Kerensky (64:
861000/600).

Odessa was the scene of a shift in power,

reported John Ray; the workers and soldiers had taken
command of their local government and declared their
stand in favor of peace and no confidence in the Provisional Government (63:861.00/525).
Disappointment has to be an understatement in
describing Francis' feeling about the Kornilov Affair.
Kornilov was a man "whose mistake was making demands
before public sentiment was sufficiently strong in their
favor to face their acceptance," Francis wrote to Judge
Henry B. Priest of Sto Louis (18:160-61).

Francis was

bitter as he wrote in later years:
Had Lvov been a wise and strong man instead of the
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meddlesome rattle-brain that he was, and had Kerensky
been big enough to place his country's welfare above
his own pride and seek some middle ground upon which
he and Kornilov might have worked against the Bolsheviks--their common enemy--they might between them have
rescued Russia and the world from the curse of Bolshevism • • • (18:156-57)0
Kerensky was viewed as a vacillating idealist by
Sir George Buchanan.

He told the British Foreign Office

that Kerensky feared a strong Russian army because it might
someday be used against the revolution (5:186).

The weak-

ness of the Kerensky government was now apparent to all.
Buchanan was no exception; in fact, he had seen a general
weakness in the Provisional Government long before others
dido
Again political beliefs split Russian attitude
toward the Kornilov Affair.

The radicals on the left wing

were opposed to Kornilov and the radicals on the right wing
were opposed to the government; the moderates favored the
government.

Support of the government was Izvestiia's

stand, because it controlled many of the governmental
operations through the Soviets (4:1597).

Those who were

in sympathy with Kornilov longed for a stronger government
and strict discipline in the army.

Kornilov offered this.

Former supporters of the Tsar, such as the Church, wanted
a stronger government (4:824).
Condemnation of Kornilov came from the Bolshevik
opposition.

They were upset because Kornilov had exposed
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the already weak Provisional Government to one more trauma tic test which surely weakened it further.

Russkiia

Vedomoski opposed Kornilov's attempted coup on the grounds
that force was not the way to change the government (4:1592).
The Kornilov Affair did not expose tacit weakness
in the Provisional Government, but showed its complete
impotence.

Kornilov's efforts to save Russia from the

grip of the Bolsheviks sped up the Bolshevik takeover by
seriously weakening the government and causing Kerensky
to arm the Bolsheviks.

It took a little more than a

month from Kornilov's defeat to the time of the Bolshevik
victory.
In October, Francis, torn between his hope of
Russian continuance in the war and his view of the rapid
deterioration of government support, persisted in sending
confusing cables to Washington.

He would describe insol-

uble conditions, then conclude by saying he had faith in
Russia's ability to emerge from the chaos in good order.
Moderate socialists had lost their grip on the
people, claimed Roland Morris, and this left an open avenue for the Bolsheviks and other radicals (64:861.00/581).
Maddin Summers extended the bad news by reporting the
economic situation was steadily growing worse; food distribution was as bad as distribution under the Tsarist
system (64:861.00/594).
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An ironic note came at this inopportune time from
Lansing to Francis.

It was a message from the United States

Chamber of Commerce telling the Russian people that they
supported the Russian fight against Germany.

The message

continued by pointing out the Chamber's honesty in not
taking advantage of war time to make excessive profits.
The Russian Revolution was for democracy and they wanted
the Russians to know that the democratic Chamber was behind
them (64:861o00/574a).

Here was a message from capitalism's

own organization telling a country that would become communist in one month that they should continue to fight for
democracy.
Even though Lansing's position toward Russia seemed
to harden somewhat, he still stated a need to aid Russia as
late as October 23.

In a memorandum he expressed the view

that a fighting Russia meant the saving of at least one
million American lives and any aid was worth at least that
much.

Too much caution, such as

~"'rancis

used, was not

correct, Lansing said, but consideration for loans should be
made on the basis of economy and efficiency, not on Russia's
stability (70:861.51/241).
The United States did not give up on Russia.

Lan-

sing's attitude was an example of America's steadfast faith
in the young republic.

Even after the Bolshevik takeover,
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the United States refused to abandon all hope of Russia
remaining with the Allies.
One topic remains for discussion in this chapter,
that of the increase in Bolshevik strength just prior to
the second revolution in Novembero

Following their attempt

at control in early July, the Bolsheviks remained semidormant until the Kornilov Affair equipped them with arms
and public reaction against the right wing of Russian politics.

The Bolsheviks won a major victory on September 22

when they gained a majority of votes in the Petrograd and
Moscow Soviets, reported Izvestiia.

The reason for the

victory was the split among the Social Revolutionaries
following the Kornilov Affair.

Leon Trotsky, a Bolshevik,

was named President of the Petrograd Soviet (4:1704); this
gave the Bolsheviks more prestige than power, but that was
what counted among an ignorant populace.
Bolshevik strength continued to increase, according
to reports by Ambassador Francis.

His messages contained

accounts of unrest and government weakness in the face of
frequent and oft-threatened demonstrations by the Bolsheviks o In the concluding days of September, Francis reported
agitation by the Bolsheviks to the point where the government decided to issue a warrant for Lenin's arrest.

Francis

feared Lenin's arrest might spark an armed clash, but the
arrest never materialized (63:861.00/558).

The selection of
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the frequently changed Ministry was cause for further conflict.

Kerensky chose a number of Cadets to fill Cabinet

posts, much to the consternation of the Bolsheviks.

Francis

speculated that Kerensky had confidence that he could handle
the threat of the Bolsheviks (64:861.00/579), but Francis
was well aware of the dangerous atmosphere existing in
Petrogrado

He wrote to his son telling him the British

Ambassador headed a list of persons the Bolsheviks planned
to kill, and he, Francis, was not far down the list of
names; however, he did not seem to be afraid (18:169-70).
In the few remaining days of October, the Bolshevik
pressure mountedo

There were many threats of demonstrations

against the government, but nothing developed on a mass
scale.

Francis did say that there was a large demonstra-

tion planned for November 2 and the Bolsheviks were to
arrest the members of the Provisional Government.

The

government said they would resist any Bolshevik attempt,
peaceful or otherwise (64:861.00/615).

October dispatches

from Petrograd ended with an altogether typical view from
Francis when he cabled Lansing:
Beginning to think Bolsheviks will make no demonstration; if so shall regret as believe sentiment turning
against them and time opportune moment for giving them
wholesome lesson (64:861.00/619)0
Sir George Buchanan was emphatic in his dislike of
the Bolsheviks and frequently stated so.

He was worried
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that the socialists would refuse to stop the Bolsheviks
because of their vague socialist brotherhood, and said that
if the government could not muster the strength to stop the
Bolsheviks soon, the only alternative would be an eventual
Bolshevik government (5:188-89).
Russian newspapers were bulging with articles
describing the obvious weakness of the Provisional Government.

The use of the word "anarchy" was frequent in these

articles when discussing the general political atmosphere.
Even the government wrote of the uncontrollable waves of
anarchy rising across the country bent on destroying Russian
society; they said this unruliness was fed by foreigners
hoping to take advantage of a weakened foe (4:1714).

There

was no uniform solution to this disorder, although most
papers agreed that the government must take a firmer stand
in controlling it.

Izvestiia reported that Kerensky was

receiving letters from all over Russia requesting government action to stop the destruction (4:1644).
As if general chaos was not enough, reports began
circulating that the Bolsheviks were agitating for Jewish
pogroms.

Headlines told of the increasing Bolshevik acti-

vity; a new mood existed among the people with the Bolsheviks
ready to harvest the benefits, claimed~ Naroda (4:1764).
The Russians could see and sense the coming attempt at dominance by the Bolsheviks.

Lenin gave a hint of the Bolshevik
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opportunity to gain public confidence when he severely
criticized the Socialist Revolutionary Party for betraying the peasants on the issue of land reform (4:581).
This criticism of the peasants' most influential party
revealed a degree of Bolshevik assurance that Russian
society was disrupted enough to let them take control.
Bolshevism was able to gain control of the Government a few short days into Novembero

The results of

Russian activity from March to November, 1917, have been
extremely controversial.

The immediate public reaction

was not disbelief at the Provisional Government's death,
but intense hatred of the Bolsheviks and hope that the
Provisional Government would return to power.

CHAPTER V
UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION
The November Bolshevik Revolution was not anticipated by the American public, but the public reaction was
not one of bewilderment and shock; rather, of intense dislike of the Bolsheviks.

Little time and space was devoted

to analyzing what went wrong in Russia; most was spent
criticizing Bolshevism and hoping for a return to power of
the Provisional Government, or its equivalent.
As late as November 2, Francis did not appear to
be worried about the government's stability.

He did men-

tion that most of the soldiers had pledged to follow the
Soviet, controlled by the Bolsheviks.

Guards were posted

outside the various diplomatic embassies for protection;
Francis did not think the action was significant, "merely
precaution" (64:861.00/620).

On the same day, Lansing

cabled Francis that the Washington Post had announced that
Russia was ready to quit the war.

He was very concerned

about this misleading article and feared unpleasant reaction in Russia, so he gave Francis a statement that claimed
the State Department had received no information from its
embassies or other sources that indicated Russia's intention
of quitting the war (64:861.00/621a).

Certainly Lansing

was worried that the Russian government would believe that
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Francis and other diplomats had given the State Department
this news; this would be most damaging to the Provisional
Government's relationship with Francis.
Internal conditions in Russia grew more confused
during the first week of November; the Bolsheviks, after
gaining control of the Petrograd Soviet, were increasing
their stranglehold on Petrograd itself.

Francis was aware

of this expansion of Bolshevik influence.

On November 7 he

revealed that the Bolsheviks had control of everything; the
Ministry had disappeared and the soldiers were sympathizing
with the Bolsheviks.

Even the majority of newspapers had

been suppressed (64:861.00/634)0

The end of the Provisional

Government had finally arrived; Francis did not mourn like
a godfather; instead he stood his ground and announced his
refusal to recognize any government instigated by Lenin and
Trotsky (18:188)0

This attitude continued to be Francis'

stand until his departure from Russia in 1918.
Action by the Wilson Administration was hampered
by conflicting reports and the lateness of Francis' cables
because of poor telegraph connectionso

Wilson wrote to

Charles E. Russell agreeing with Russell's letter asking
for United States propaganda to show that Russia's revolutionary success depended on continuance of the war (1:349).
Although the United States had little in common with
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communist Russia, Wilson would let Russia determine her
own destiny in the hope that she would re-enter the war.
Much of the information received by the State
Department concerning the latest Russian revolution came
from Morris in Sweden; Francis wrote to Morris because of
the difficulty sending information directly from Petrograd
to Washington.

Consequently, Morris was in a good posi-

tion to relay the new events, and he described in various
cables to Lansing that the Bolsheviks had taken control of
Petrograd and appeared to have the support of the Soviet.
Immediately following the Bolshevik takeover, several actions were taken by the Petrograd Soviet.

Trotsky

proclaimed the Provisional Government dissolved, arrested
some of its Ministers, and took a vote which indicated
lack of confidence in Kerensky as a leader (64:861000/630).
Later reports confirmed that the Bolsheviks had more control and there were more arrests of government personnel.
The Mayor of Petrograd had formed a committee of public
safety to oppose the Bolsheviks, which was supported by
the American and British Embassies.

Morris notified

Lansing that Kerensky was willing to fight the Bolsheviks
(64:861000/645).

Finally, on November 19, Morris related

the feeling of Russian visitors to Sweden that the Bolsheviks would not last long because of their lack of
support from many socialist parties (44:237)0
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Bolshevism was able to gain more popular support
in November than earlier in 1917, because their plea for
a separate peace was more appealing than in March.

The

sudden illusion of democracy in March added spirit to the
war effort and the people seemed willing to fight for their
newly won freedom.

This spirit soon dwindled because war

was just as devastating and cruel under democracy as it
had been under Tsardom.

Consequently the Bolshevik cry

for "Bread, Land, Peace" became increasingly appealing to
the Russian people.
The move for a separate peace was strong in the
earlier hours of the Bolshevik government.

Francis was

aware of this move and reported it to Lansing, when he
wrote that a peace proposal was not a move for Russia
alone, but for all Allies (44:236).

The declining fight-

ing spirit of the army and their deplorable fighting
conditions made any proposal for peace very popular with
the soldiers.

Francis was not concerned with this, but

he was disturbed at the Russians for negotiating an armistice without consulting the Allies; he reminded Russia
she had promised to continue fighting, using all her ability (44:252)0

It is not difficult to understand Francis'

displeasure with the Bolshevik peace move.

He had worked

hard to encourage the Provisional Government to stay in
the war; to have a group of people, whom Francis never
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understood, dislodge that government and immediately call
for an armistice was more than Francis could bearo
Francis continued to display his intense dislike
of the Bolsheviks in his reportso

Protection of the

American Embassy was offered by the Bolshevik government,
but Francis declined lest it indicate a form of recognition
of the Lenin-Trotsky government (18:183).

The popular rumor

that Germany supported Lenin and his followers was accepted
by Francis as well as by many State Department officials.
Francis' beliefs were confirmed by German Secretary of
State Kuhlmann on December 3, 19170

He stated that the

Germans had in fact funded Bolshevik activity in Russia
(4:1381).
By the end of November, any hope of Kerensky's
government returning to office had diminished considerably.
The only hope left for Francis was that the remaining
socialist parties would overcome the Bolsheviks and form
a more moderate government.

As a result, Francis watched

the elections for the Constitutional Assembly with keen
interest and told Lansing that it did not look like the
Bolsheviks would win a majority.

This was encouraging to

Francis (44:272), and his speculation proved to be correct;
nevertheless, the Bolsheviks powered their way to complete
dominance of Russia in a short period of time.
One final note remains to be explained concerning
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David Francis' reaction to the Bolshevik takeover.

When

the Tsar fell in March and Prince Lvov formed a government,
Francis eagerly requested State Department permission to
recognize the new governmento

However, upon seeing the

Bolsheviks gain office, Francis was less willing to extend
a friendly hand; he was reluctant to ask Lansing what he
was to do concerning recognition of the Bolshevik government.

Lansing hurriedly cabled Francis that he was not to

extend recognition to the Bolsheviks; he explained that
the United States was waiting for further developments
(44:254).

When the wrong party acquires control of a

government, it is understandable that the United States
would hesitate to aid it with the prestige of her recognition.
To conclude State Department reaction to the
November Revolution, a note from Maddin Summers in Moscow
must be considered.

Swnmers candidly described the deplor-

able conditions in the army, and said peace or no peace,
the Russian army was not able to fight effectively.

He

concluded, however, that the most important American job
was to combat German propaganda and hope the "better elements" in Russia would regain power.

Thus, he felt it

essential that all American agencies stay in Russia to
aid the propaganda campaign (44:235).

Summers, as well

as most Americans, refused to give up hope that in the
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near future the Bolshevik fantasy would disappear and sanity
would once again rule Russia.
Alexander Kerensky was critical of the Bolsheviks,
not so much of the individuals, but of their unethical tactics.

Much of the Bolshevik agitation was directed at

Kerensky personally; he thought this was damaging to the
Provisional Government in the long run.

The dual role

played by the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government for support of the people was unbalanced by the
Bolsheviks' insistence on including the soldiers in the
Soviet membership.

This gave the Bolsheviks unwarranted

influence in that body (30:233).

The basically ignorant

people of Russia were unable to distinguish between the
Soviet and the government at times, thus severely damaging
the government's authority and stability (30:233).
Kerensky admitted that land reform was too slow in
coming to realize support from the people, but he countered
that none of the opposition offered a workable alternative
to the government's program (30:225).

Despite this and

similar shortcomings, Kerensky insisted the Provisional
Government could have succeeded if it had not been for the
unethical and unfair lies spread by the Bolsheviks against
the governmento

Personal defamation toward himself con-

cerning the Kornilov Affair, Kerensky explained, proved to
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be "one of the major factors in the destruction of democracy in Russia" (30:423-24).
Generally, the public reaction to the Bolshevik
takeover was similar to the State Department's; the people
expressed disappointment at the Provisional Government's
fall and opposed the Bolshevik government.

Before Novem-

ber 7, the public seemed to be aware of trouble because
many articles were written in the newspapers concerning
Russia's ability to continue fighting in the waro

The

New York Times ran a front page story on November 3 reproducing Lansing's letter to Francis describing the Washington
Post's article about Russia quitting the war.

The article

made it quite emphatic that Russia was not out of the war.
But in the same paper, an editorial criticized Kerensky's
tacit statement about Russia withdrawing from the war before
it actually happened (42:3rd/1)o
Some Americans realized the overwhelming odds
against the actual success of the Russian Revolution in
developing Russia into a democracyo

The blame, in part,

was placed with the general backwardness of the Russian
peasants.

Simon Litman wrote that contrary to a few

earlier claims, the Russians lacked a basic understanding
of free choice on a national level, and the Russian masses
followed the party that offered the most benefits in the
shortest time.

He claimed the Bolsheviks took advantage
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of the poor internal conditions and the people were not to
be blamed for following their lead; the freedom Russians
sought was not to be criticized (34:181-91).

Writing in

1'.h£. Russian Review, Leo Pasvolsky described the Provisional
Government as lacking real authority to guide the Russian
people, and said the Kornilov Affair was the final blow
before its downfall (45:7-38)0
Criticism of the Provisional Goverrunent was not
widespread; Kerensky himself received the brunt of the critics' blows.

One comment from

should be notedo

~

Nation on November 8

It censured the Allies for not reducing

their war aims, and commented that because the Allies
refused to cooperate with Kerensky's goverrunent in his
pledge to change the war aims, it greatly weakened his
government (73:501-2).

By the time The Nation hit the

newsstands, their fears were reality--Kerensky's government had fallen because the people lost faith in its
ability to carry out its promises.
Russian Ambassador Boris Bakhmeteff was not sympathetic to the Bolshevik governmento

Understandably, he

would not represent them because of divergent viewpointso
Bakhmeteff said that the American State Department would
not recognize Lenin's government and would instead continue
to recognize himself (42:25th/2), as he perpetrated the
Russian attitude of continued fighting against Germany.
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When news of the Bolshevik Revolution reached the
United States, there was immediate response on Wall Street;
the market dipped eleven points in some areaso
of the year's worst declines (42:9th/1)o

It was one

Because Allied

war contracts were a great factor in the stability of the
Stock Market, it was highly susceptible to any unrest
among the Allies; the Bolshevik Revolution caused the market to drop.
United States newspaper reaction at first was
limited to descriptions of the Bolshevik takeover and
Kerensky's attempt to wrestle control of the government.
Many of the articles criticized the Bolsheviks but they
did not laud Kerensky's former governmento

Disruptive

activity in Petrograd filled most of the early articles
with comments about the Bolsheviks' irresponsibility in
using power.
Much of the public reaction to the second Russian
Revolution was anti-Bolshevik.

The people disliked the

Bolsheviks mainly because they caused Russia to drop out
of the war and forced America to accept a larger share of
the fighting.

Two years later, in 1919, the American

people developed an equal hatred of the Bolshevik philosophy.

The label of pro-Germanism was pasted on the

Bolsheviks; it was popular to lump all enemies of the
Allies as pro-Germ.an.

One can easily understand this
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feeling that the Bolsheviks were aiding the Germans when the
Americans could see more of their sons dying on the Western
front because the Germans no longer had war on two fronts.
Hope was expressed by many that a new government
would emerge in Russia and topple the Bolsheviks.

Leo

Pasvolsky, editor of Russkoye Slovo, a New York daily, said
that the Bolshevik rebellion was treasonous; it would
shortly be crushed and replaced by a government pledged to
convening the Constitutional Assembly (42:9th/2).

Little

doubt was left that the United States would recognize any
government established in opposition to the Bolsheviks.
Jews expressed open dislike of the Bolsheviks; the
Bolsheviks had overthrown the only Russian government to
even mouth equality for the Russian Jew, and it was only
natural that the Jews would not favor the Bolsheviks.
Herman Bernstein was emphatic that the Jews were not in
sympathy with the Bolsheviks in a speech before the Institutional Synagogue (42:19th/2).
Not all Americans viewed the Bolsheviks in the same
light; most were opposed to them, but there were a few that
did not view their new government as such a grave threat to
American democracy.

The American people were slow to rea-

lize the actual threat that Bolshevism presented to Germany,
related William B. Thompson.

He insisted the Bolsheviks

represented the antithesis of Germanism and therefore were
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an overpowering threat to the Germans (13:1408-10).

Others

felt that the Bolsheviks did not maintain enough control
of the government to impose an immediate peace as they had
threatened.

The communists did not speak for the Russian

people, said the~ York World (2:10).

Charles Johnston

backed this last argument when he wrote in the North Ameri£.fil:! Review that the Duma represented all Russians, whereas

the Bolsheviks did not (24:378-87).

Anti-socialism and

pro-right wing political philosophy were consistent thinking by Johnston.
Optimism ran high in the early days following the
November Revolution that the Bolsheviks would soon fall
and be replaced by some form of democratic government.

A

New X2.!:k Times editorial left no doubt that the Bolsheviks
would not be able to retain power in Russia (42:11th/E-2).
American officials expressed the same view; among these
were

s.

R. Bertron, former member of the Root Mission, and

Senator Meyer London.

President Wilson saw the new Russian

situation as a temporary setback in the war effort, but
continued to believe that Russia would soon return to
assisting the Allies (42:12th/3).

The newspapers and peri-

odicals were literally weighed down with optimistic articles
concerning the return of a democratic government to Russia.
In all fairness, it must be said that not all shared
this hope.

One example is George Kennan, who did not
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sympathize with the Bolsheviks at all, but took the more
realistic view that European Russia was lost to the Allies
and it was now necessary to save Siberia from the same
fate.

He contended that when fighting for Siberia, the

.Allies must support the majority of the Russians and not
the Bolsheviks (27:141).
Alexander Kerensky was the last leader of the Provisional Government and consequently received the majority
of the blame for its failure.

The Atlantic Monthly called

him a "virtual dictator" just before the Bolshevik takeover,
but concluded that the people were willing to follow his
lead (78:693-703).

Kerensky's image deteriorated the more

time elapsed after the November Revolution.

Many people

heaped total blame on Kerensky's shoulders for Russia's
failure in their only experiment with democracy.

The most

common charge against him was his temporizing with the
Bolshevik problem.

The New York Times accused Kerensky of

trying to please everyone and allowing the Bolsheviks to
gain strength (42:10th/12).

Correspondents Julius West and

Harold Williams, traveling in Russia during November, related
that they did not hear a kind word about Kerensky from the
people (42:18th/2;74:250-51).

By November 18,

a~

York

Times editorial stated that Kerensky's attempt to raise an
army was unsuccessful because the people had lost all faith
in him (42:18th/E-2).

The disenchantment with Kerensky
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continued to grow, people became bitter toward him; his
failure meant that more Americans would die in Europe and
he received the indirect blame.

His name was finally

linked with Bolshevism when the Times referred to his
political philosophy as Kerenskyism in the same sentence
as Bolshevism (42:20th/12).
Kerensky never did, in the first few months after
November, 1917, gain back the confidence of the Russians or
Americans he once commanded.

It was not uncommon to see

articles written six months after his fall blaming him for
not demonstrating a stronger will when confronted by the
Bolshevik threat, although as time progressed this criticism became less harsh and more understanding.

There was

no difference between Kerensky and the Bolsheviks, commented the New Republic, except that Kerensky was loyal to
the Allies whereas the Bolsheviks were noto

The article

went on to chastise the western Allies for not understanding the differences between the Russian moderates and
extremists, concluding that a change had been necessary if
they had wanted Russia to stay in the war (3:335-38)0
~

The

Republic displayed this more understanding analysis of

Kerensky, but the search for a stronger conservative leader
continued.
The primary concern of the United States upon
hearing of the Provisional Government's fall was whether
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or not Russia would remain in the waro

Separate peace was

a very unpopular idea among Americans because they thought
it would increase fighting on the Western front.

President

Wilson was against a separate peace and admonished the
pacifists.

"I want peace," he explained, "but I know how

to get it, and they do not" (42:13th/1)o

Many Americans

were critical of the Bolshevik bid for a separate peace,
claiming they did not represent the true feelings of the
Russian people.

Lincoln J. Steffens, after touring Russia,

concluded that a separate peace could not be realized
because the Russian people did not want it, and they were
the real leaders of Russia (42:10th/2).
been farther from the truth.

Nothing could have

Henry P. Davison of the Red

Cross agreed with Mr. Steffens that the masses were not
desirous of a separate peace (42:9th/2).
Testimonials continued to ring in the air with hope
and trust in Russia; few news media carried articles that
stated otherwise.

The United States wanted Russia to con-

tinue to oppose Germany; it was an easy thing to believe
they would, despite the indications they would not.

Wil-

sonian ideals were so paramount for saving the world for
democracy that the American public was temporarily unable
to tolerate any opposition, especially by the little known
and arrogant Bolsheviks.

EPILOGUE
Since 1900, the United States has developed into an
omnipotent international force; when she makes a foreign
policy decision, the entire world is affected.

Sometimes

the United States uses this power in a careless and even
selfish manner.

United States relations with the Russian

Provisional Government of 1917 was such a case.

President

Woodrow Wilson decided to fight Germany, hoping to change
European imperialism to a more liberal form of international
order, but instead unintentionally aided the Bolsheviks in
taking over control of the Russian governmento
After the collapse of the Romanov dynasty, Russia
was thrown into war and faced with having to establish a
new form of government.

The Russian people were not

accustomed to representative government, and frequently
reduced themselves to mob rule.

Politics and political

parties were able, for the first time, to operate without
fear of government reprisal; thus confusion resulted as
hundreds of years of political censorship were erased.
The Russian political picture did not tell the
whole story.

Russia was involved in a war against Germany,

Europe's strongest military machine; the ill-equipped Russian army was no match for the German armyo

The Allied

powers encouraged Russia to remain in the war, and at times
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even threatened to curtail economic aid if Russia did not
fight.

The Allies were more interested in keeping Germany

at war on two fronts than they were in helping Russia
develop her first representative government.

In all fair-

ness to the Allies, diplomacy of war takes precedent over
everything during wartime.
Russia's task of developing her first representative government and waging war at the same time were in
direct contrast.

In order to successfully conduct a war,

a country must be internally stable; the Provisional Government was not.

Failure of Kerensky's offensive in early

July, coupled with procrastination in convening the Constitutional Assembly and implementing land reform pushed the
people to the point of rebellion.

Following the attempted

coup in July by the Bolsheviks, the Provisional Government
eroded with each crisis"

The Kornilov Affair left the

government standing almost alone while the Bolsheviks were
preparing for the November Revolution.
United States-Russian day-to-day diplomatic relations
were generally formulated by David R. Francis, Ambassador to
Petrograd.

There were numerous other American representa-

tives to Russia during 1917, but only Francis wrote what
the Wilson Administration wanted to hear.

Being the first

Allied representative to recognize the new Provisional
Government, Francis felt an obligation to support this
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government.

His dislike of socialists and his hatred of

the Bolsheviks prevented Francis from being an effective
reporter to the United States Department of State.

His

dispatches to Robert Lansing were filled with confidence in
the Provisional Government and distrust of the Bolsheviks.
A variety of United States special missions were
sent to Russia in 19170

The accomplishments of the missions

were negligible during the time of the Provisional Government; however, the Stevens Railroad Commission was of some
assistance after the Bolsheviks gained power.

The Root

Mission, the most well known of the missions, came back to
the United States with their opinions of Russia basically
unchanged, and with weak suggestions for correcting Russia's
ills.

The two leaders of the Red Cross Mission, William

Boyce Thompson and Raymond Robins, interfered in Russian
political matters, and kept that Mission from performing
its intended dutieso
International political philosophy played a major
role in United States-Russian relations during 19170

Pre-

sident Wilson developed a world philosophy that eventually
proved to be in direct opposition to Vladimir Lenin's world
revolutionary philosophyo

Wilson had faith in the basic

capitalist system, and was willing to fight Germany to save
it.

Germany was not an enemy of the United States; rather,

she was imperialistic, and Wilson wanted to eliminate this
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imperialistic element from Germanyo

On the other hand,

Lenin opposed waging war to save capitalism, but favored
immediate socialist revolution to destroy capitalism.
Lenin was concerned that the Allies, if successful in the
war, would replace the socialists in world reform.
Philosophical differences between Wilson and Lenin
markedly affected Russia.

Wilson's insistence that the

defeat of Germany be the first priority left Russia in a
precarious position.

Following the March Revolution,

Russia's feelings toward the war were mixed, but as the
months passed, the hardships grew more intense and the
mood quickly changed.

Opposition to the war and impatience

with the slow progress of the revolution became the general
attitude of the Russian people.

Lenin's alternative philo-

sophy of abandoning the war for more expanded and rapid
revolutions was appealing to the Russian people by late
1917.

The insistence by Kerensky and Wilson that the war

be concluded before political reform be accomplished was in
direct opposition to the progress of the March Revolution.
By November, the Russian people developed the feeling that
the revolution was more important than the war; this mood
was synonymous with Bolshevik propaganda and consequently
helped instigate the Bolshevik Revolution.
Following the November Revolution, Bolshevism
became an anathema in the United States, as was evidenced
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by the Red Scare of 19190

Nevertheless, the United States

was less hostile to Bolshevik Russia during the Versailles
Peace Conference than was Britain or France.

President

Wilson believed the Russian people should determine their
own fate; therefore, he was hesitant to assist the Russian
nationalists in opposition to the Bolsheviks.

Wilson's

political philosophy, and in turn, United States-Russian
relations, unintentionally assisted the Bolsheviks in
overthrowing the Kerensky government.
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